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Abstract
This work examines the role equitable economic development plays in ensuring the sustainability
of peacebuilding processes. In so doing, it illuminates how economic inequality in a conflictaffected region can intensify unrest and distrust within and between communities. This paper
begins by highlighting the context of the Northern Ireland conflict and its historical roots. Next,
we explore how socioeconomic and political inequality contributes to the emergence and
sustenance of varying levels of conflict. We also consider the importance of addressing these
inequalities as an essential part of peacebuilding and development approaches that seek to be
sustainable. The paper’s final section outlines the findings from the analysis of the data collected
and suggests that effective and sustainable peacebuilding in Northern Ireland must entail such a
process involving businesses that facilitate equitable development as well as providing
opportunities for the socioeconomically excluded to acquire employment and training.

Introduction
This article emphasizes the essential role that equitable economic development plays in
facilitating the sustainability of peacebuilding processes. This is done by showing how economic
inequality experienced by a population in a conflict-affected region can intensify unrest and
distrust and make peacebuilding unsustainable. Youth living in such conditions of poverty and
inequality are often unemployed or underemployed, leaving them vulnerable to be manipulated
and/or recruited by non-state armed groups (Mc Evoy-Levy, 2017). This analysis explores the
Northern Ireland peace process, based on information provided by study participants who lead
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) funded through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) or
the European Union (EU) Peace 3 Fund.
In this vein, this article begins by highlighting the context of the Northern Ireland conflict
and its historical roots. Next, we explore how socioeconomic and political inequality contribute
to the emergence and sustenance of varying levels of conflict. We also consider the importance
of addressing these inequalities as an essential part of peacebuilding and development
approaches that seek to be sustainable long after the peacebuilders have exited and taken their
economic aid with them. We then present the research methods with which the data used in this
study was collected. The final discussion section outlines the findings from the analysis of the
data collected and suggests that effective and sustainable peacebuilding in Northern Ireland must
entail a process of ensuring that marginalized individuals and groups be re-included
socioeconomically. Such a process could involve supporting social purpose businesses that
facilitate equitable development by focusing not just on making a profit but providing
opportunities for the socioeconomically excluded to acquire employment and training.
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The context of the Northern Ireland conflict
The roots of the Northern Ireland conflict intensified during the sixteenth century. Ulster was the
most militant part of the island of Ireland, and it was settled by Planters in 1603, and this led to
the flight of the Earls and the 1641 rebellion as local people slaughtered the planters (Byrne et
al., 2010). The planters were English and lowland Scottish Calvinists who abhorred the Catholic
religion and used counterinsurgency warfare against the Ulster Gaels (Cairns & Darby, 1998).
They did not intermarry with the Ulster Gaels, leading to the development of a siege mentality in
which the settlers believed they were surrounded by religious enemies.
The apartheid 1692-1830 Penal Laws meant that Irish Catholics couldn’t practice their
religion, hold land or public office, or receive an education (Rahman et al., 2017). In 1745, the
Irish supported Bonnie Prince Charlie Stuart’s attempt to retake the British throne. Irish
nationalism became more militant during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 1790
United Irishmen rebellion was led by political dissenters connected with the ideals of the French
revolution. The rebellion was crushed by the English army and the leaders were hung. The 18441850 famine witnessed 1 million tenant farmers perish and 1 million others take the coffin ships
to the US, Canada, and Australia as the British government exported food out of Ireland as the
poor tenant farmers starved (Rahman et al., 2017). The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and
the Fenian Brotherhood grew in America and provided aid for the IRB in Ireland.
The Unionist bourgeoisie in Ulster drove an ethnoreligious wedge between Catholic and
Protestant tenant farmers as the land question stimulated constitutional nationalism (Bew et al.,
2002). The slogan of land for the farmer became Ireland for the Irish. The Irish Parliamentary
Party in the House of Commons put pressure on the British PM, William Gladstone to grant
home rule to Ireland so Ireland would have its own parliament in Dublin while remaining under
the UK political umbrella (Byrne, 2009). The Ulster Protestant political and economic elite did
not favor home rule, and they beat the sectarian drum to keep the working class divided on
sectarian lines as they connected land ownership with Irish Catholic nationalism (Byrne et al.,
2009). Ulster Unionism and protecting the union with Britain arose in opposition to home rule
and land reform.
Violent Irish nationalism emerged through the poetry of Padraig Pearse who organized
the IRB’s 1916 Rising with socialist James Connolly that was defeated and the leaders executed
by British General Maxwell (Hyde & Byrne, 2015). In 1912, the Ulster Solemn League and
Covenant was signed by Loyalists in their own blood in city hall in Belfast cementing their
loyalty to the British monarch. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was also created at this time,
and at the outbreak of WWI, many northern and southern Irishmen enlisted in the British army
(Byrne et al., 2009).
Michael Collins commanded the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) guerilla warfare against
Black and Tan British forces during the 1919-1920 war of independence. The resulting 1921
treaty partitioned the island into the 26 county Irish Free State, and the six county Northern
Ireland under control of the Ulster Unionist Party. The Treaty was marginally ratified in the Irish
Dail and the 1922-1923 civil war was fought between the pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty IRA
(Creary & Byrne, 2014).
Populist Unionist policies prevented a working-class alliance as Catholics opted out of
the governance of the Northern Ireland statelet (Bew et al., 2002). The liberal Northern Ireland
Prime Minister Terrence O’Neill sought to modernize the statelet in the 1960s and include
Catholics, which was perceived by the Catholic Nationalist community as cosmetic politics (Bew
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et al., 2002). Dr. Ian Paisley and radical Protestant Loyalists objected to O’Neill’s positive
signals to the Catholic community, and they began to mobilize (Bew et al., 2002). In 1967,
students from Queen’s University of Belfast led by Bernadette Devlin, Eamonn McCann, and
Michael Farrell organized the Belfast to Derry nonviolent march that was attacked by Dr.
Paisley’s Loyalists. The conflict escalated into violence and British troops were put on the
streets. The British government suspended the Belfast Stormont parliament and introduced direct
rule from London (Byrne et al., 2009). British paratroops killed 14 nonviolent marchers in Derry
city in 1972. None of these troops were found guilty of criminal acts and this escalated the
violence (Byrne, 2009).
The IRA split into the Provisionals (PIRA) and a more mainstream Marxist oriented
Official IRA (Maiangwa et al., 2019). In the 30 year’s long war, the PIRA fought with the state’s
security forces and the Loyalist paramilitaries, with over 3,000 people killed during the 30-year
Troubles (Byrne, 2001). The British policy toward Northern Ireland during this period was one
of crisis management (Bew et al., 2002). The ceasefires in 1996 allowed the three-tier
negotiation process to move forward under the leadership of US Senator George Mitchell. Strand
one of the talks dealt with the relationship between both the British and Irish governments, strand
2 addressed the relationships between Northern Ireland’s mainstream political parties and the
political representatives of the paramilitaries that renounced the use of violence (Hyde & Byrne,
2015).
The 1998 Good Friday or Belfast Agreement brought an end to the political strife in
Northern Ireland. Over $4 billion was allocated to Northern Ireland from the IFI and the EU
Peace and Reconciliation Fund to build the peace dividend (Murtagh, 2016). The aid has made a
difference, yet Northern Ireland remains a deeply segregated and polarized society as both
communities live in their own enclaves, attend different schools and churches, and play separate
sports (Todd & Ruane, 2012). The key issue of two ethnic identities tied to the same territory has
not been addressed and lies at the very core of the conflict (Maiangwa et al., 2019). The recent
Brexit debacle with Britain withdrawing from the EU and the Irish Sea border taking place with
the Covid global pandemic means that Ireland and Northern Ireland continue as before in terms
of allowing the free flow of trade across the Border while Northern Irish goods face inspection
and control processes going into the UK. In effect, Brexit may have sped up the process of Irish
reunification and the break-up of Britain as Scotland may soon vote to leave and become an
independent country within the EU.
Socio-economic and political inequality and ethnic conflicts
This section considers how socioeconomic and political inequality contribute to the emergence
and persistence of conflict, to underscore why peacebuilding interventions must be intentionally
designed to address these forms of inequality if they are to be sustainable.
Inequality and conflict
The causes of violent conflict are complex and diverse, and their dynamics and relevance are
often transformed over time (Mac Ginty, 2008). Hence, while poverty and economic inequality
are not the only cause of conflict, they can constitute important contributing factors. When
expressed in significant gaps between the rich and poor, who may also be divided across
intergroup lines of ethnicity and religion, economic inequality contributes significantly to direct
violence and is also a sign of structural violence. Economic causes of conflict are not necessarily
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based on greed, as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) assert but can be brought about by legitimate
injustices (grievances) in the form of economic inequality within and among groups. The basic
human needs theory sees the denial of both material and non-material needs as resulting in
violence when people attempt to force the system to meet these needs (Burton, 1990). Absolute
or relative deprivation, whether in the form of poverty, income inequality or unequal distribution
of revenue from natural resources, can cause and/or intensify violence (Kett & Rowson, 2007;
Jeong, 2021). A situation of relative deprivation or poverty can also initiate or sustain violent
conflict in the way that it may inflame existing divisions in society. Even in situations where
economic inequality does not cause direct violence, it creates a form of structural violence
(Galtung, 1969) where individuals whose economic needs are unmet cannot fully accomplish
their potentials. This is especially significant for socioeconomically excluded youth, who are
deprived of critical opportunities for advancement at a crucial age.
Economic inequality engendered by neoliberal ideals of unburdened economic
liberalization and individuals’ sole responsibility for their economic success has contributed to
interethnic conflict in several states (Chua 2003). While economic liberalization may produce
some level of economic growth, it also often brings substantial inequality (Harvey, 2005,
Bräuchler, 2021). This inequality is typically considered a useful trade-off for economic growth,
and so liberal peacebuilding has often promoted an approach to community development that
ignores socioeconomic inequities that results from policies of economic liberalization. While the
inequality produced by policies of unrestrained liberalization may be mitigated in more stable
societies that can provide substantial social welfare services to poorer citizens, this is not always
the case in fragile states where such inequalities may inflame already existing sectarian divisions
(Chua, 2003; Selby, 2008, Huber & Mayoral, 2019).
In fragile, sectarian states, inequality that emerges as a result of neoliberal
peacebuilding’s approach to development often worsens “the social tensions that resulted in
violent conflict in the first place” (Newman, 2011, p. 1748). Such inequality, where specific
ethnic groups, social groups and/or classes benefit more than others can hinder peacebuilding,
leaving citizens dissatisfied with the existing system and potentially available to be recruited by
non-state armed groups claiming to fight for their interests (Pugh, 2011; Smith, 2010; Selby,
2008). Economic inequalities engendered by ideals of unburdened economic liberalization have
outrightly resulted in interethnic conflict in several states in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and
South Africa (Chua, 2003). Such conflict is contrary to the claims that free market ideals and
democracy will generate prosperity and end intergroup conflict (Chua, 2003; Richmond, 2014).
Hence, impactful peacebuilding is not just about facilitating economic growth, it is also about
ensuring that such economic growth emerges in an equitable manner that all members of society
benefit from.
Significant state support is needed if peacebuilding is to bring about sustainable
development, especially in communities that have suffered extensive violent conflict. People
living in communities that have experienced conflict require state support to acquire economic
and social goods and/or skills required to improve their lives (Sen, 1999). Economic inequality
that emerges out of an ideology that people are solely responsible for pulling themselves out of
poverty with no assistance furthers socioeconomic divisions in fragile states, as citizens question
the purpose of a state that cannot supply necessary social safety nets (Newman, 2014). Such
citizens dissatisfied with the state can provide a greater pool for non-state armed groups
performing resistance against such ineffective states to recruit from (Huber & Mayoral, 2019;
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Petrasek, 2000). This is especially so for youth who are unemployed, poor and altogether
excluded socioeconomically (Agbiboa, 2015).
Hence, nongovernment organizations do not preclude and cannot replace a
developmental state that directs macroeconomic affairs and creates an enabling environment for
local development initiatives to prosper. Effective economic development often involves a strong
state immersed in various areas through the creation of essential industrial policy, export
promotion policy, innovation policy and so on (Desai, 2011; Moyo et al., 2016; Patnaik, 2016).
Friedman (1992) argues that while most approaches to local development tend to position the
state as inefficient, peacebuilding processes seeking to expand local capacity for development
require collaboration with the state, and conflicts cannot be contained locally. Effective
developmental states can support local actors to determine priorities, build their capacity to
implement these priorities, and adopt supportive policies that create a favourable environment
for local development projects (Friedman, 1992). Local people’s knowledge and agency
produces a plurality of nonviolent peacebuilding practices that de-silences marginalized groups
voices (Kroeker, 2020).
Socioeconomic inclusion and sustainable peacebuilding
Addressing economic inequality is an important part of peacebuilding in conflict-affected
societies especially when such inequality is one of the underlying causes of direct violence.
While minimizing economic inequality may not totally incapacitate the recruitment capabilities
of non-state armed groups carrying out violence, it can at least reduce the pool of those who can
be easily recruited into such groups. This approach to peacebuilding is in line with Burton’s
(1990) conception of “provention,” which involves removing the structural causes of conflict and
creating new structures that facilitate peace. Such structures include those that perpetuate
economic inequality.
Peacebuilding should take into consideration the fact that activities of non-state armed
groups have often flourished in societies that are socially conducive for such acts and there is
often a need for fundamental changes to address the injustices in the society (Jeong, 2005). As
Burrowes notes, “entire systems of structures, nationally and globally, will need to be changed, if
human needs are to be universally met” (1996, p. 75). Further, addressing economic inequality
could also allow the government to regain the support of a population that has thrown its support
behind non-state armed groups which have promised them a better life if they are able to
overthrow the government (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2009). This can hamper armed groups’
recruitment capabilities and win the people’s trust on issues surrounding poverty and economic
inequality.
Peacebuilding interventions that ignore the economic and social needs and the inequality
that the intervention may be creating or contributing to are typically unsustainable (Newman,
2011). A more sustainable approach such as the human security perspective envisions
peacebuilding as a process of empowering individuals to address the inequalities that have
contributed to the conflict by first securing their economic and social rights (Cahill-Ripley, 2016;
Newman, 2011; Sottini & Ciambotti, 2020). The human security approach also goes beyond
needs language to conceptualize economic concerns as essential rights that peacebuilding must
first secure to succeed (Cahill-Ripley, 2016). These economic and social rights are considered
critical to the accomplishment of the political and civil rights typically touted as the totality of
human rights in the liberal statebuilding approach. Citizens cannot genuinely fulfil political
rights such as the right to vote or contest in elections when they do not have access to economic
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rights like the right to food or health care. Fulfilling economic and social rights empowers
individuals to be more authentically engaged in political and civil processes (Richmond, 2014;
Sen, 1999).
Post-conflict development seeking to avoid the continual perpetuation of inequality must
look beyond simply creating economic growth to ensure that such growth is equitably
experienced across the concerned society. Richmond (2014) argues that to create a truly
emancipatory peace, peacebuilding and statebuilding endeavors must address the socioeconomic
inequality produced by neoliberal ideals of business that focus only on profitmaking. Studies
have found that disadvantaged youth in conflict-affected regions are resilient, often possessing
the ability to engage in ingenious, entrepreneurial activities to secure their economic rights
(Agbiboa, 2015). Sustainable peacebuilding should explore this capacity for community
development by supporting such disadvantaged youth to develop and maintain socially minded
business or be integrated into existing ones. Such social-purpose businesses are concerned not
just about making profit, but also producing positive impacts within societies. Hence, socialpurpose business can be seen as an attempt to put human security ideals into practice, in that they
seek to integrate disadvantaged people into the mainstream economy in a way that contributes to
diminishing economic inequality (Oloke et al., 2018; Oloke, 2021). Peacebuilding requires the
development of such institutions that are focused on generating economic growth that is
equitable and experienced tangibly by individuals at all social levels.
Political inclusion and sustainable peacebuilding
Economic inequality, which is often an outgrowth of exclusion from the mainstream economy,
goes together with political exclusion. Political exclusion here refers to both exclusion from the
peacebuilding process and from being involved in determining the political fortunes of the state.
Neoliberal peacebuilding, typically carried out through state institutions, often unfolds in a topdown fashion that seeks to develop economic, political, and social institutions that purportedly
make for peace, while excluding local actors (Burke, 2012; Duffield, 2010; Richmond, 2009).
This is the political equivalent of the process of entrenching free-market, self-help ideas of
economic development that ignore inequality and poverty while supposedly facilitating
economic growth.
When peacebuilding is based only on the ideas of external actors, whether they are donor
states or organizations, it tends to be ineffective in addressing the systemic issues that have
caused and continue to perpetuate the conflict (Galtung, 1996; Murtagh, 2016). It is often easier
for external actors to control peacebuilding processes, and even attempts to ensure local
ownership of such processes are often not able to effectively do so (Arandel et al., 2015; Creary
& Byrne, 2014; Hasselskog & Schierenbeck, 2015; Thiessen, 2013). In some cases, only the
elites within a population are included in the process of developing the peacebuilding processes,
and often end up benefitting disproportionately from the projects implemented (Rosser &
Bremner, 2015).
For peacebuilding to be sustainable and efficient, it must include community members’
inputs. Local ownership contributes to the sustainability of peacebuilding in the sense that when
communities are involved in the peacebuilding process in authentic ways, they tend to be more
dedicated to ensuring the success of such reconstruction efforts (Byrne et al., 2010; Reimer et al.,
2015). Participation in local peacebuilding also increases the chances that community members
will be satisfied with the development process and consider the process successful, which in turn
increases the legitimacy and stability of the agreement reached (Bercovitch, 2009; Bangura,
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2019). Similarly, Leatherman and Griffin (2009) suggest that when governments take part in the
planning stage of interventions and NGOs are accountable to the communities where they
operate, the capacity of development aid to be sustainable is increased. Ultimately, involving
community members in peacebuilding allows them to gain the skills to not only address the
current conflict, but also to prevent or mitigate future conflict and facilitate development (De
Coning, 2016, 2018; Hyde & Byrne, 2015).
Further, the local ownership of the sociopolitical aspects of the peace process can also
contribute to addressing economic inequality if genuinely implemented (Jeong, 2005; Bangura,
2019). Inclusion in local peacebuilding is not restricted to either socioeconomic or political
concerns; both forms of inclusion work together to influence each other and generate sustainable
development (Sen, 1999). Political inclusion, which gives people a voice, also provides such
individuals with the capacity to clamour for policies that address their economic needs. Equally,
economic freedom attained through the satisfaction of basic human needs also provides people
the capacity to participate in democratic processes (Thiessen & Byrne, 2018).
Further explicating the importance and interconnectedness of political and economic
inclusion, Friedman notes that capitalism has essentially excluded several poor people from
effective economic and political participation since “to be economically excluded is to be
politically excluded” (Friedman, 1992, p. 20). Galtung (1996) conceptualizes both political and
economic exclusion as structural violence, which refers to unjust societal structures that cause
individuals to achieve below their potentials (cited in Byrne & Thiessen, 2020, p. 131). Positive
peace or social justice focuses not just on stopping overt violence against persons, but also on
facilitating the development process by addressing human needs (Galtung, 1969; Jeong, 2020).
Hence, authentic local ownership of the peacebuilding process has the benefit of addressing both
economic and political inequalities.
Addressing the socioeconomic and political exclusion disadvantaged individuals,
particularly youth, face is an essential way of transforming such individuals from easy recruits
for violent groups to agents of sustainable peacebuilding and development (Agbiboa, 2015).
Based on the foregoing, when determining what local actors’ capacity is (Schirch 2013), external
actors providing aid must focus on supporting actors whose primary objectives are to facilitate
development that is equitable.
Practitioner experience and research has indicated that when external peacebuilders
support programs at the local level rather than at national or regional levels, the sustainability of
peacebuilding is increased. For such local level peacebuilding processes to be successfully
implemented, the political structures of the state must provide for decentralization (Arandel et
al., 2015). In this situation, external actors must carefully tread the line between respecting local
autonomy by allowing for authentic local ownership and ensuring that structural problems are
addressed in the peacebuilding process. This is important to prevent these processes from being
coopted by local elites. The role of external peacebuilders is not to impose development projects
or policies on a given community, but to stabilize it and support it in building the resilience
needed to manage and avoid future conflict. Ideas from all levels must be interwoven in a way
that ensures that peacebuilding is geared towards identifying and addressing inequalities (Mac
Ginty & Richmond, 2016). External actors must find the balance between providing material
resources to address violence and allowing the local system to adapt to address challenges in a
way that creates the ability to withstand future pressures without resorting to violent conflict (De
Coning, 2016).
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Methods
The qualitative data below is from 120 semi-structured interviews carried out by the second
author with CSO leaders building cross community relations in Derry and in the Border counties
of Armagh, Cavan, Derry, Donegal, Fermanagh, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, and Tyrone. The
second author interviewed 107 local NSO leaders involved in peacebuilding, and three IFI
community development officers and ten EU Peace 3 development officers during the summer of
2010. These leaders’ experiences and perceptions of the funding process, cross community
peacebuilding and reconciliation activities, and the peace process itself shed light on the
effectiveness of the economic assistance from the EU Peace and Reconciliation or Peace 3 Fund
and the IFI on building the peace dividend in post peace accord Northern Ireland. All the
recorded interviews took between 60-120 minutes to complete, and they were transcribed
verbatim. The respondents were from both the Protestant Unionist Loyalist (PUL) and the
Catholic Nationalist Republican (CNR) communities. The second author did not experience any
difficulties during the field research.
The following research propositions, developed based on the conceptual framework
highlighted in the literature review above, were explored in this study: economic
underdevelopment and inequality worsened ethnic tensions in Northern Ireland and allowed
violent groups to easily recruit members; economic inequality is intertwined with political
exclusion; developmental state support, coupled with local ownership of peacebuilding, is
integral to sustainable peacebuilding.
Findings
Themes emerged inductively from the interview transcripts. The following data focuses on how
youth are impacted by the peace process and economic assistance from the IFI and the EU Peace
3 Fund.
Structural inequality as idle hands throw stones
It is important for young people to have employment opportunities that supports their hopes for
their future. These opportunities will engage young people productively, and prevent a brain
drain of young talent from leaving their communities. A CSO leader noted that inequality,
discrimination, and sectarianism are the core issues that started the conflict and continue to
divide the community.
Ciaran: There’s a regeneration process going on across the city, and we have argued at
the center of that is equality, fairness, and targeted initiatives into the most deprived
areas. This city will never grow, thrive, and prosper if we have people that don’t benefit
from the absence of war. And the peace process, and the IFI, and the Peace money
haven’t tackled that enough. It didn’t look at the injustices or the inequalities that existed
pre-conflict and look to eradicate them, if that has been their core mission.
Civil rights started here about jobs and housing, and all of that and Galtung could
probably have been here in 1966, 1967 to forecast conflict. Because what you had was
serious inequality, serious discrimination, and all the rest that bubbled. And then there
was a wider thing in sight, and the two came together and that’s what the conflict in the
late 1960s was about.
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The external funders and both governments frame the division as a solely ethnopolitical conflict,
ignoring other crucial precipitating factors around the intersection of class, poverty, inequality,
and the relationship with Britain.
A CSO leader communicated that despite the influx of resources from Peace funding,
inequality exists as an impediment to good community relations and is something community
development workers tackle daily.
Aidan: I’d see the values of community development as being simple equality, inclusion,
and participation. Around equality a longer conversation about whether we are genuinely
equal or are we all sharing the same levels of inequality, equality in around health and
education within the Northwest is as ripe as it ever was. Whatever levels of equality have
been achieved, can you paint a direct line between that and Peace?
For most people in this city who probably would self-perceive as
Nationalist/Republican/Catholic, the fact of the city being registered somewhere as [X]
does not stop people from being included, does not stop people participating, does not
stop people displaying acts of citizenship, and feeling civic pride. Some would say there
is a political dimension within that coming through.
Why should we feel as if any change to the name of the city could be used as a
legitimate excuse for a percentage of the community to withdraw in any sense…. There is
something there about civic responsibility and looking for reasons not to feel included
and claim that you know why we should participate or that’s an example of equality.
As people from both communities share and negotiate their living space daily, they retain civic
pride in their community that transcends sectarian politics.
A CSO leader argued that Peace 3 resources should be used to fund community
development work by creating as many jobs as possible in the community, even if the new jobs
do not last. This is because unemployment is a key issue and young CNR people are being
targeted by dissident paramilitary groups. Local entrepreneurs can stimulate the local economy
and break the dependency welfare culture.
Fintan: [X town] has the worst employment in Northern Ireland. The employment was
very high in 2005, and I don’t see it getting back to that lower level until 2020. And it is
one of the areas that has strongest dissident Republican activity, and that is still going on
there. And those issues with disengaged young people. So, employment is a real issue,
and we must do whatever we can. Northern Ireland has a huge dependency culture. We
think that we are such nice people that somebody else should solve our problems for us.
We should be creating our own companies and our own jobs, that’s the surest and
the best way to do it, and less depending on the world…The world will not come here to
give us a living. We must be out. We must go the marketplaces and find the work and
create the jobs back home. But we don’t even really accept that. We just kind of assume
that somebody is going to solve the problems for us. It’s a bit like the welfare state will
look after us, you know. But the welfare state must be paid for by someone.
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People in Northern Ireland tend not to take risks or do anything innovative without assuming that
somebody else will pay for it. While people have overcome the worst of the immediate
problems, they must now identify and address other major issues that need to be solved and stop
resting only in their accomplishments to date. The community needs to face the scale of what
they still must do to create a just and equitable society.
A CSO leader noted that sectarianism is deeply entrenched in the society, and the
political leaders in Stormont are not fully committed to supporting the peacebuilding and
community development work that CSOs are actively engaged in.
Callum: In terms of sustainability, I do not feel there is a meaningful political buy-in to
this work, not at all. So, if it doesn’t sustain afterwards who’s going to say we don’t
believe in peace and reconciliation, everyone believes in it. But in a meaningful way, no
there’s no time limit, no policy for community relations activities in the schools. In
education all programs have been stopped, because they can’t agree on a policy. So, if
they can’t agree on a policy, they can’t commit to consultation, they can’t consult on it.
They can’t do an initiative for people to apply for funding.
It’s crazy to have a big party that is Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) particularly a religious party, saying vote for me first because I’m a Protestant. So,
there’s a logic of people going back to this that reflects the attitude, “well I’m Protestant
so I have to vote DUP.” So, how to get through that? I think we are a generation away
from that. You do have pockets where people vote for good people because of their
policies. You don’t vote for people because of where they go to church or mass. Its crazy,
daftly crazy.
Engagement in politics along sectarian lines remains entrenched and it may take at least a
generation for the public to begin to vote on socioeconomic and political issues. The conflict
between political parties over education policies has made it difficult for CSOs who work with
schools to apply for funding.
A CSO leader communicated that the voluntary third sector was very active during the
Troubles when they used the little or no resources available to establish community centers that
support youth to get off the streets. Yet even though today’s professional peacebuilders are
comparatively well funded for their services, this leader feels such funding dollars are being
poorly spent.
Gary: You think about all the groups throughout the worst years of the conflict here in
the North like small community groups and stuff like that, and most of it was purely
voluntary by certain people within the community. They weren’t getting a wage. They
weren’t given anything. They were just very passionate. They’d seen the young people
involved in conflict on the streets and so on. And they went ahead and setup wee
community centers just to bring the young boys in off the streets because we would have
been young then too and we remember that…. But by today the groups that are in place
today they’re called the voluntary sector, but they are not voluntary they are funded.
They’re well paid for it, and maybe to a certain extent there is some commitment and
belief in it, but it is motivated by the money you know.
Re-imaging Your Community, and it was the British government’s money, spent
1.3 million pounds towards the eradication of paramilitary and sectarian murals. But ever
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since that has gone up now, they have spent something like four million pounds on it….
There was an outcry right across this city, and I’m sure it was the same in Belfast and
other regions. It was that there were more worthy groups within these communities like
people that are dealing with alcohol addictions, drug addictions, woman issues, people
that are dealing with an array of issues within the community but were struggling on a
shoestring budget just to get by, and they were enraged by that...
I would say that the powers that be, the institutions, the funders, the reconciliation
groups including the Northern Ireland Tourist Board in their eagerness to present a
positive and a respectable face in Northern Ireland are creating a vacuum. When the
funding dries up, they are going to reap it. There is an underbelly and the real work and
the real reconciliation, and the real mutual understanding that used to exist is not really
reaching the right people. And it is not really impacting the communities that are
suffering the most, and have suffered the most and probably will go on suffering the most
because of a lot of what is happening here in the North...
There is a politicization of peace as the paramilitaries and their political representatives have
taken over community development and peacebuilding to implant firm roots in the community.
Some CSOs are jealous and compete with other CSOs. The developing peace is cosmetic and
superficial as communities that suffered during the Troubles and have real needs are not
receiving the resources needed to lift them out of dire poverty.
There is an underbelly in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties as inequality causes
great distress for communities. Young people who finish school find few employment
opportunities available to them and they become targeted by the paramilitaries. In addition, some
political leaders are more interested in engaging in sectarian politics rather than in securing the
economic rights of youth needed to lead Northern Ireland into a brighter economic future.
Develop the individual and the peace in the individual
Real peace takes time. CSOs need resources to continue the much-needed work to transform
relations and structures and instill peaceful values in the people, as Northern Ireland continues to
remain a highly segregated society. CSOs are important vehicles in the reconciliation and
peacebuilding efforts on the ground.
A CSO leader proclaimed that the making of real peace takes time; it takes time for
people to see and feel the intangible as well as the tangible benefits of peacebuilding. Hence, the
CSOs working on the ground in local communities must be supported so that their legacy is
sustainable.
Ronan: I think it is a serious concern because obviously that expectation is there that the
current round of funding will finish. Peacebuilding is a long-term process, its something
that you can’t just flick over a few years. It is a major mindset in individuals and in
communities, and in families that’s required. So, there is quite a mind change that needs
to happen that is a slow process, it is an incremental process, and is only achieved if
individuals involved will see some benefit. And incremental benefits won’t always apply
to everybody at one point in time, so it will take time for everybody to see the actual
benefit.
So, an example, as I said is with older people. This is the first time when we have
specifically targeted older people to make sure that they see a benefit out of the peace
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process and the communities. So, I think as we go down through it, we certainly could
think of other groups within society that would merit targeting in terms of a particular
intervention around the benefits of peace and that there’s an argument for that to be
continued.
There are other excluded and marginalized communities around the Border region that need to be
brought into the mainstream to enjoy the benefits of the peace process.
A CSO leader avowed that relationships and networks will continue despite the loss of
resources from external funding agencies, and that some CSOs are not sustainable.
Grainne: Well obviously with some of the actions that we have done, the fact that the
relationships are built up already we would hope that they would be sustainable in that
sense. And that sometimes its not all about money. Sometimes its all about you know
baiting the networks there, getting people to know each other that didn’t necessarily
know each other before. And in other cases what you would be looking for would be that
it would be mainstreamed.
And you would like to see kind of the Irish government in particular kind of
recognizing that this was something that had to be done in Border Counties, and it needs
now to be supported. And sometimes I feel it’s looked on as, “ah, that’s their work up
there, they’re doing that. They have the money for it.” And I don’t think the work on the
ground is appreciated at the national level, and therefore it doesn’t look as if a lot of the
projects will be sustainable with mainstream funding.
The Irish government does not appreciate the dedication and voluntary contributions made by
CSOs to make a positive difference in local Border communities.
An EU Peace 3 development officer contended that local Councils and central
government expect the voluntary sector to continue to run these projects for free, and that this is
their idea of sustainability, instead of funding good worthwhile local projects. As the older
generation who started these CSOs begin to retire or become too tired to continue, a vacuum may
emerge, as young people are not inclined to replace that leadership. In his view, it is difficult for
young people to change over from working for themselves to work for the community and the
sustainability of the local economy. He also revealed a duplication of CSOs providing similar
services in a very tight and competitive community development and peacebuilding market.
Darragh: Well in terms of the work with the immigrants, with the Nigerians and the
Kurds and so on. If they are at a point where they see themselves as just the same as
anybody else in the community then that’s the exit strategy, that’s done, its happened. It
won’t be perfect; it never will be. But it’s happened. So, I mean it is sustainable then, and
in fact it increases the sustainability of the local economy because you have got more
people participating actively in society, and contributing to voluntary groups...
It is sustainable. It is bringing people from a level of the old saying was “you keep
your head down.” The Protestant community keeps its head down and does its business
and carries on. And they realize now they don’t have to do that, and there are these
opportunities that will arise with the European money…. But once they’re at that stage
and in quite proximity to the ex-prisoner organizations that they’ll recognize one
another’s differences, and that they’re moving ahead. And once they’re working on their
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own issues there’s a relationship, which is not a hostile relationship now, so that’s all
sustainable.
This participant noted that Protestant community groups are working with ex-combatant groups
on joint projects. He also reported that most cross-cultural exchange visits between towns in the
Border Area and throughout Northern Ireland are not sustainable because once the funding ends,
people will lose interest in participating.
A CSO leader articulated that the interlinking of community development and
peacebuilding work is one of the great successes of the funding. The CSOs became the vehicles
for reconciliation, providing essential services and building shared relationships on common
issues and rich local history around the Border Counties. CSOs are making a positive impact on
the next generation.
Fiadh: But it is a bit more difficult now because of the climate we’re in financially. And
while you hear of other core programs that aren’t necessarily for peacebuilding that are
suffering now. It is a worry because like they are all very essential services…Three or
four years ago we wouldn’t have seen the problem.
Now we have a problem, I think. But I suppose that reinforces that we can make
the best of what we can now when we have the funding. But I suppose the answer is it
depends on the current economic situation nationally, and in Europe at the time as to
what other supports will be available to maybe have a lesser level of input. Because some
will say it will survive, but you know you can’t take out that level of funding and expect
them all to survive totally.
Some may survive and I think they will, like some of our programs anyhow are
run by volunteers, trained volunteers and they in goodwill may continue doing what
they’re doing on a voluntary basis. But they do need some support whereas we will not
be able to employ specialist facilitators as we do now. There needs to be, even with
volunteers, they need a bit of support.
Some CSOs will have to close due to a lack of funding, yet others with a strong volunteer
component will survive and continue to provide essential services to their local community.
Community development is an ongoing process that volunteers will participate in regardless of
resources. Sustainability is not about funding; it is about the capacity and goodwill of people to
work for their community in an ongoing community development process.
A CSO leader highlighted that an ethnic conflict impact assessment needs to be done to
see whether the resources from funders were positively used or were making things worse. He
noted that it was as important to build relationships through dialogue as it was to provide jobs for
people. Measuring the intangible benefits of CSO peacebuilding activities was difficult and the
donors determined where their resources went. He argued that it was irresponsible for the
funders to abandon those CSOs where people have taken out mortgages and run up debts to keep
their projects going.
Bernard: There’s a whole number of areas where you can have a positive impact at
community level and not all of them are about jobs. It could be about intersubjective
dialogue, building empathy, all that kind of stuff. And in some way that is more
important you know, increasing employment on its own isn’t going to solve the legacy of
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the conflict. I’m not sure I’d be so kind of utilitarian as they say, jobs are the only thing
that matters because I don’t think its true. Now I really do think that a lot of this is kind
of intangible and very hard to measure, and so no. I’m kind of glad in some ways that that
wasn’t the main criteria.
You know the other thing as I have said is that you only have the jobs very often
if the money is coming in, and if the money is cut off in three, six years-time then you
know sometimes you leave people in a worse situation. They have taken out mortgages
and run up debts and so on, and then suddenly the money is taken away from them. I
think its almost irresponsible, you know, sometimes more thought isn’t given to this
issue.
Well, it’s this thing of first this donor captures. So, the donors determine where
the money goes. So, the donors determine what gets priority, what are the areas that are
important, and that distorts to a degree what is happening at the grassroots level. And
then there’s the abandonment that comes after the distortion. So, you know they can have
a serious impact on the dynamics of the kind of peacebuilding.
The best way to get peace in a modern state between different ethnonational groups is through
“generalized affluence” (Gellner, 1996). When people begin to feel better off and notice that they
have a future in a society they may be less likely to turn to violence to solve their problems.
Socioeconomic inclusion done well and combined with encouraging political inclusion can
transform relations and build a just and sustainable peace.
A CSO leader believed it takes time to transform relationships and structures, as
peacebuilding is a gradual incremental process of changing society. Like the previous
participant, they also emphasize the importance of building relationships and values, noting that
economic sustainability is not the only factor that should be focused on.
Oisin: So, what is economically sustainable and who measures it, and who determines it?
The people who up until now have been determining what economic sustainability is
have been shown to be charlatans. So, let’s not have them judging us whether we’re
economically sustainable. I don’t think life is about economic stability or economic
sustainability. Life is much more about building relationships and building on values and
ethos, and moving it on and in the hope and trust that you get the resources to do it…
And the IFI is reconsidering putting more money into what is happening here and
redefining it and putting the money towards areas where people are less well off, or the
most disadvantaged or whatever the jargon is. You know this is a welcome development
that IFI themselves are thinking, “well the work is not over in 2013.” So, of course the
work will never end in a sense of peacebuilding in our lives whether we are from a wartorn society or living in a peaceful society like Canada, peacebuilding must continue
every day and in every way we can.
CSOs continue to work at peacebuilding because violent conflict can flare up unpredictably and
get out of control in a short period of time. Substantial efforts can assist a society in reaching a
tipping point to change things and advance the peacebuilding agenda, although it may take time.
A CSO leader explicated that when the funds come to a natural end, any community
structures that were put in place on the ground will disappear. Peace 3 and the IFI have funded
core innovative projects that must be built into government departments and their strategies.
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Seasoned CSOs with their experience must continue to deliver peacebuilding and reconciliation
projects in the grassroots so that the community can have a shared future together.
Ashley: …Some of them are very, very good projects. And I would have to say some of
them are very, very bad projects, because there are people on projects out there that are
not delivering what they should be delivering, and to meet their outputs. Ten small
projects sometimes can make more of a difference than one huge one, and sometimes one
huge project can make a difference better than ten small ones. It depends where the
people are at that minute. My concern is that the infrastructure and the projects that are
out there now are being nearly dilapidated to such a degree that by 2013 will there be
anything there to pick up the pieces?
And will the people with the experience be there or will they have become so
disillusioned by it? A primary example is here the Special EU Programs Body (SEUPB)
which was going to go through the local Councils… It may not have been perfect, but it
was workable, it built capacity, it showed inclusion, it allowed grassroots voices to be
heard…. less bureaucracy, less chance, less risk taking, less nothing. But they then didn’t
want any social partners even on their Peace boards. They were quite happy with only
statutory departments, Councils, and representatives of SEUPB…. Look there must be
inclusion of social partners.
How could you deliver on Peace, set your objectives, set you action plans without
social partners? And if you want to be involved in one of them projects you must go in
with the lead partner and the statutory agency to tell you how to deliver your Peace
project, it was quite bad. And I think that is when a lot of people turned their back on it
and said that really is not peace and reconciliation work. The community sector was up in
arms about this here. Yes, you will have external evaluation, who’s going to evaluate it to
see if it made an impact or not?...
And we look around now and just say it doesn’t make any difference they have
taken the Peace money, and put it inside the government structures, put the government
there to run the thing through the departments and the main agencies with people again
being marginalized. Yeah, we have no objections to it. But we weren’t consulted on it,
and we don’t think Peace money should have been used on it. It should have been local
government money if you want to put infrastructure in….
She noted that SEUPB included statutory Departments and Councils and excluded social partners
to streamline the administration of Peace 3. The resources were used to subsidize government
projects while deep reconciliation projects that could have made a difference were excluded.
Ashley felt that the safe middle-class hands of greenism and orangeism in the civil service had
their hands all over the distribution and administration of the funds. The British and Irish
governments took Peace 3 resources to fund government projects rather than getting those
resources out to CSOs to run local projects that are essential for the betterment of the
community.
A CSO leader articulated that the peace work in the city needs resources to sustain the
peace on the streets.
Sorcha: Everybody is wary of Peace funding drying up, but it must end sometime, and
we are all realists, and we know it must end sometime. We know that peace needs to be

Ireoluwatomi Oloke and Sean Byrne

16

fought with more voracity than a war was fought. And like a war needs resources like
weapons, peacemakers need resources to build peace, so we can never take our eye off
that ball.
But I do think we’re hearing with our new coalition government in place, there
will be future cuts in the public sector funding…. Bureaucracy and red tape and the very
fact of middle management or top management within the public sector. And like we just
heard in yesterday’s news that the top civil servant in Northern Ireland is earning 175,000
pounds per year, which is more than the Prime Minister, so you know that needs
addressing.
There needs to be more equality…. The similarities between a Russian missile
and a civil servant are they don’t work, and they can’t be fired…. A government must be
for all the people. And you must get it right particularly for the most vulnerable within
our societies and communities because they need the most help.
In the wake of future cuts to public sector funding, CSOs working for the most vulnerable
members of society must be supported by government. This is because young people, for
example, are crossing the peace bridge in Derry and going into each other’s communities as a
result of the cross-community projects funded through Peace 3 and the IFI.
Relations will continue to flourish despite the loss of funding. Both governments want the
CSOs to continue the peacebuilding and reconciliation work for free. The CSOs’ core innovative
and creative ideas must be embedded in government departments. The sustainability of the
voluntary sector is threatened not just by the loss of funding but by the loss of older activists that
are not being replaced by youth who are not being trained and mentored for those positions.
Local government was also coopting Peace 3 resources for their own agenda rather than using
the aid for what it was intended for in building cross communal relationships.
Discussion and Conclusion
When adequately equipped, youth in conflict-affected regions have the potential to contribute
significantly to the positive transformation of conflict that has raged decades before they were
born. However, if such youth are excluded socioeconomically and politically, they can
perpetuate the continual persistence of conflict (Schwartz, 2010). In line with the first research
proposition presented in this study, the discussion of study participants shows that youth in
Northern Ireland continue to experience significant socioeconomic exclusion as evidenced in
significant rates of unemployment and underemployment, as well as political exclusion. This
suggests that these youth’s capacities for positive development are not being properly harnessed
through peacebuilding endeavours, leaving such youth easy targets to be manipulated by
paramilitary groups. Participants note how inequality, discrimination, and sectarianism
contributed to the Northern Ireland conflict in the first place and how patterns of inequality have
continued in the peacebuilding process. Economic benefits of peacebuilding are not accruing
equally to all members of the community and patterns of inequality continue especially with
youth facing significant unemployment as they leave school.
Hence, it is important to assess the trajectory of inequality that contributed to the conflict
in the first place. Violent conflict is often caused by multiple factors interacting in dynamic ways
and gaining varying levels of relevance over time (Mac Ginty, 2008). The causes of the Northern
Ireland conflict at its most basic can be seen as the political conflict unfolding between the PUL
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and CNR communities, alongside a mix of other interrelated historical, religious, political,
economic, cultural, and psychological factors that contributed to the conflict (Cairns & Darby,
1998; Hyde & Byrne, 2015). And so, while it is fallacious to reduce the cause of the Troubles to
poverty and economic inequality (McGarry & O'Leary, 1995), inequality played a significant
role. External inequality exists in the way that Northern Ireland is one of the least affluent
regions of the United Kingdom (UK), but there is also internal inequality across religious and
social groups that has also furthered divisions (Cairns & Darby, 1998; Todd, & Ruane, 2012).
Youth that have experienced violence also tend to live in communities experiencing significant
poverty and underdevelopment (Cairns & Darby, 1998; Pruitt, 2017).
Young people aged 16-24 in Northern Ireland “have suffered most during the Troubles”
in terms of the high rate of unemployment they experience; their susceptibility to criminal
activity; their increased likelihood to have witnessed, perpetrated and/or been victims of
sectarian violence; and their exclusion from meaningful political participation (Hargie, 2011, p.
881). The issue is not just about unemployment, which has reduced to some extent, but there is
also significant underemployment in Northern Ireland. A significant portion of the population
barely survives on poorly paid jobs and the benefit of peace seems to accrue more to the wealthy
and less to the poor (Coulter, 2014; Kelly, 2012).
The COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately affected youth in Northern Ireland by
increasing unemployment and aggravating pre-existing inequalities, and youth unemployment is
poised to continue increasing even as the economy recovers (Community NI, 2021). For
example. 4.1 percent of the economically active people aged 16 and above in Northern Ireland
were unemployed between June-August 2021 while 71.1 percent of people aged 16 to 64 were
employed (NISRA, 2021). The economic inactivity rate (proportion of people aged 16 to 64 who
were not working and not seeking or available to work) was significantly high, at 25.8 percent
(NISRA, 2021). Northern Ireland had the fifth-lowest unemployment rate, the lowest
employment rate, and highest economic inactivity rate within the UK (NISRA, 2021).
Given that economic inequality contributed to the Northern Ireland conflict in the first
place, effective and sustainable peacebuilding in the region must focus on engendering equitable
development. This is in line with the second and third research propositions presented in this
study. While addressing economic inequality is not the singular remedy for the conflict, it “can
be an integral part of an overall multitrack peacebuilding process that tackles the deep roots of
structural conflict that have contributed to the protracted nature of the Troubles” (Byrne et al.,
2008, p. 122). As the CSO leaders cited above note, peacebuilding funding must be spent on
more sustainable and productive activities that address poverty especially with regards to the
youth. Peacebuilding cannot be sustainable when a community has large numbers of unemployed
and underemployed youth that have limited opportunities for economic development. Those who
feel socioeconomically excluded will at best be largely uninterested in seeing the success of the
peace process and at worst, may actively work against the success of such processes or be easily
recruited into new paramilitary groups like the New Irish Republican Army (NIRA) or the
Orange Volunteers and Protestant Action Force (PAF). In this way, inequality can hinder
peacebuilding and development.
Aid to Northern Ireland can be more effectively spent on the provision of employment
and/or opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial activities for disadvantaged Northern Ireland
youth. This is important, to ensure that peace dividends are being spread equitably across society
and reaching the marginalized members of society, instead of being concentrated in the hands of
only a few (Schnabel et al., 2014). Funds spent on creating jobs for young people and funding

18

Ireoluwatomi Oloke and Sean Byrne

relevant business activities would stimulate the economy and protect these individuals from
being easy targets for paramilitary groups to recruit. This is a more sustainable way of using
development funds that is more likely to result in the production of tangible outcomes.
Concentrating funding only on intangible work around facilitating dialogue and building
relationships carried out by community-based organizations is unsustainable. Such activities
must be accompanied by initiatives that directly impact youth’s lives by creating employment
opportunities and promoting socioeconomic inclusion. Some studies have even found that during
such economic development processes, divisions within societies that have experienced sectarian
conflicts can be bridged (Bratberg, 2013; Sentama 2017). This suggests that there is some link
between economic inclusion and the political and social inclusion it can also facilitate. Hence,
organizations in Northern Ireland should not just be funded because of their closeness to Loyalist
and Republican paramilitaries that purportedly allows for stability (Edwards & McGrattan,
2011). Rather, economic aid should go to those who have the potential to carry out work that
addresses poverty, inequality and social exclusion.
Social purpose businesses like social enterprises may be especially suitable for creating a
form of economic development that is equitable because they either provide jobs to marginalized
individuals or constitute sites for them to gain training and experience needed to acquire
mainstream employment (Oloke et al., 2018). The Northern Ireland social enterprise sector has
been successful in building trust in the community, while also providing jobs to those excluded
from the mainstream economy (O’Shaughnessy & O’Hara, 2016). However, most Northern
Ireland social enterprises seem to be largely reliant on funding and are registered as charities
(O’Shaughnessy & O’Hara, 2016). Hence, managers of new and existing social enterprises
should be supported to become more sustainable by acquiring improved business and
commercial skills. Youth can also be encouraged and supported to begin their own social
purpose businesses that have the capacity to become self-sustaining at some point after they have
been established (Özerdem & Sukanya, 2015).
Also important is the public sector’s support for social business by creating policies that
ensure that a percentage of government procurement of goods and services goes to social
enterprises and other social purpose businesses. Social purpose businesses that are too small to
take on public sector contracts by themselves can partner up to take contracts with other
similarly minded business. The public sector can also be flexible in handing out contracts
suitable to the sizes of smaller organizations. Social purpose businesses are particularly involved
in the process of facilitating development that is equitable because they focus not just on making
a profit, but they also concentrate on positively impacting society. Hence, supporting the
emergence and viability of these businesses is a major way of developing a sustainable approach
to community development that rewards those who create social impacts and provides
opportunities to include the socioeconomically and politically excluded.
The impact of an economic development approach focused on the most marginalized
groups in Northern Ireland (including unemployed youth) may not be immediately evident, but
this does not mean that these processes are not making an impact. For true peace to be
experienced in Northern Ireland, equitable, sustainable peacebuilding must take place. Northern
Ireland must go beyond envisioning peacebuilding as “capable only of asking ordinary people to
name the constitutional arrangement under which they would like to be unemployed,
underemployed, underpaid, forced to into zero hours contracts or split shifts…” (Coulter, 2014,
p. 774). Rather, the structures that cause disadvantaged youth and other marginalized groups to
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be excluded from the mainstream economy must be replaced with structures that facilitate their
inclusion and allow them to achieve their potentials.
The whole of Northern Ireland will benefit when all members of society, particularly the
youth, can explore and improve their existing capabilities. Inclusive development processes
ensure that previously marginalized individuals are socioeconomically and politically included
into the peacebuilding process and are better capable of preventing or addressing future conflict
(De Coning, 2016; Friedman, 1992; Sen, 1999). The need for such sustainable peacebuilding is
important so that positive outcomes gained from peacebuilding do not immediately disappear
once economic aid has ended.
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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes how Covid-19 has impacted borders and xenophobia. In particular, it looks
at how four countries with generally right-wing politics, but not necessarily right-wing
viewpoints, have used xenophobia to deal with Covid-19: The United States, Japan, Brazil, and
Australia. This paper chronicles the expected rise in blaming other countries for the spread of
Covid-19 with unexpected consequences. Rather than solidifying national borders and
constituencies in the face of an international threat through xenophobia, right-wing countries
have instead created a successful border creation process with little room to expand. The options
seem to be a fragmentation of these countries into internal borders.
KEYWORDS: Covid-19, borders, bordering, nationalism, governmentality, democracy, The United
States, Brazil, Japan, Australia.

INTRODUCTION
This article explores the consequence of the use of borders and xenophobia as a pseudo-cure for
Covid-19. This article focuses mostly on countries characterized by right-wing politics, mainly in
the iteration of right-wing populism that functions by demonizing immigrants, minorities, and
bureaucrats (Mudde, 2004; Mudde, 2018; Müller, 2017). While the countries studied here, The
United States, Japan, Brazil, and Australia, have had varying degrees of success or failure in
curbing the spread of Covid-19, they all have turned to some form of displacement where Covid19 occurs outside of a border. Borders are mentioned here as bordering, a process where politics
and thought that sustain a border occur far away from a nation-state's borders, often in linguistic,
visual, and cultural practices (Shachar, 2019; Amoore and Hall, 2010). Indeed, to understand
borders, it makes sense to distinguish what most people think of fortified borders as “barriers”
(Jones, 2012) rather than borders. For example, the U.S.-Mexico border fence and related
technological surveillance is a barrier, whereas anti-Mexican nativism in Wisconsin is bordering.
There is a border between the European Union and non-European Union nation-states,
sometimes with clearly marked barriers in the form of fences. However, racist claims that
undocumented African immigrants threaten European identity or even that the E.U. ought to
maintain borders with non-European nation-states is bordering. Thus, borders are at once
“barriers,” something far from a nation-state's interior and thus separate from it. It also exists as a
social practice within the interior of nation-states through bordering. Indeed, as Jones (2012, 3)
explains, barriers are explained as responding to “external” threats but are created in response to
internal issues. Bordering is where the consequences of peoples’ ideas about borders reach
immigrants and foreign countries and where the border's violence becomes real within nationstates.
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Since traditional borders, barriers, and violent national practices are increasingly blurred,
how could bordering could occur in a way that sets a prelude for how these us-vs.-them
distinctions could set the stage for national dissolution? This paper argues that the initial
responses to Covid-19 partially follow “governmentality.” However, this is occurring in the
context of an updating of what Foucault refers to as “governmentality.” Updating
governmentality is necessary because today’s governmentality does not follow the same ethical
ends. “Broadly, governmentality refers to institutionalized practices of administration and the
frames of knowledge that inform them, designed to manage the conduct of individuals and
populations toward some notion of the collective good” (de la Dehesa, 2017, 254). However,
right-wing governments’ responses to Covid-19 show that this international governmentality, the
creation of groups by marking some populations as safe and others as threats, tunnels into the
past in ways that regress toward brutality rather than order defined by the “the collective good.”
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
Scholarship about the politics of Covid-19 shares a few initial trends, regardless of
recommendations or evaluations. The first has to do with how it treats space and time. Space is
important to Foucault’s work because Foucault’s work deals with the distribution and control of
people and populations over space (1977, 141). On the one hand, the academic scholarship may
focus on a spatial analysis of Covid-19. On the other hand, it may focus on temporal analyses of
Covid-19. Some articles may address both. Space and time are significant because Covid-19
affects people both spatially, that is, where it is and is not, and temporally with questions of how
long it has taken to spread and how long it will last. A combined spatial and temporal
consideration is necessary to understand Covid-19. A second issue is how much the literature
highlights spatiality and temporality. Sometimes more extended time frames are suggested,
whereas words that are about time are used in not obvious ways. In sum, a more obvious
reference to combined space and time seems to be brewing within the academic scholarship
about Covid-19 but could use more clarification.
Spatial analyses of Covid-19 may take the form of international comparisons or domestic
analyses. International differences have occurred in the quickness of Covid-19 prevention
responses, often determined by the price of life (Balmford et al., 2020). Successful Covid-19
policies across East Asia have often rested on a competitive regional nationalism (de Kloet, Lin,
and Chow, 2020). Failed Covid-19 containment in Japan may be better addressed by increasing
regional power rather than relying on the national government (Yamazaki 2020). Local actors,
such as indigenous people or working-class organizations, have filled in the absence of Covid-19
mitigation policies in Brazil (Ortega and Orsini, 2020). In sum, studies have distinguished spatial
differences within global, regional, and national spaces. These differences sometimes point
toward the politics of inequality.
More temporally focused analyses focus on the Covid-19 crisis's origins, the Covid-19
era's characteristics, and potential futures. The origins of or at least past trends that enabled the
spread of Covid-19 have been of particular concern. For example, Trump has been able to rise to
power and manage Covid-19 the way he has because of a weakening of the U.S. Federal
government since the 1980s (Agnew 2020). Covid-19 may intensify but did not create problems
in liberal democracies that existed before Covid-19 (Galston, 2020). Potential failures of
governments to deal with pandemics have been known for years, but not the possibility of it
occurring with a right-wing populist in charge of the U.S. government (Maxmen and Tollefson,
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2020). The abovementioned articles look at Covid-19 partially as an equally distributed illness
by evoking national time. What then of how Covid-19 affects inequality? Some articles
disaggregate the nation-state to look at events in time as they affected different class, ethnic, and
racial groups. The wealthy elite transmitted Covid-19 to Brazil, with consequences far more
severe for oppressed groups (Conde 2020). Latin America has a persistent, unacknowledged
history of spreading viruses to oppressed racial groups during its colonial expansion (Hoffmann
2020). Another way to temporalize inequality in Covid-19 is to look at it as a specific era that
negatively affects undocumented immigrants (Ventura Miller et al., 2020), albeit at the potential
expense of not understanding how inequality against immigrants is persistent throughout U.S.
history. To the latter extent, Grandin (2019) explains how the frontier, with the violent
oppression of non-whites living there, has been the persistent fix to the United States’ domestic
problems. Determining origins is difficult at best, but perhaps its most successful use is in
thinking about the impact of Covid-19 in terms of how long it may traumatize society and how
society and politics are likely to change.
The future also comes into play in understanding the Covid-19 pandemic. For example,
Covid-19 social distancing has affected the future of activism (Chenoweth, 2020). Covid-19 also
makes urgent a break from neo-liberalism for policies more attuned to ecological issues (Milani
2020). Covid-19 is not the only recent event to influence thought about the future. Recent
scholarship about the politics of the future has focused on climate change (Wainwright and Mann
2020), the fall of capitalism (Frase, 2016), and international politics after the fall of our current
global order (Cerny, 2010). Deleuze’s virtuality theory suggests multiple paths for the future,
whatever may come (Smith, 2010). The upshot is that virtuality may become a reality (Smith
2010). A limit on virtuality is “potential,” imposed by politics, and may inhibit a positive future
(Berardi 2019). Thus, the future already exists, as it has been pre-planned. However, past failures
may inspire future political change (Benjamin and Du Bois, in Shapiro, 2016; Guattari, 2009).
The new turn to considering specific futures during Covid-19 and other traumatic situations may
suggest a shift in how political science responds to current events. Analysis or prescription?
The literature reviewed thus far points towards a politics of nationalism at the
international and national levels. Yet, how does national power lead to a seemingly contradictory
dissolution of nation-states? At this point, one answer lies in Anderson’s assertion that
nationalism developed outside of national territories in colonies, where people began to imagine
themselves as parts of national groups (Anderson, 2006). Thus, nation-states do not require
territory. However, it may also be necessary to answer whether or not government agencies have
always been used to solve their problems. It is essential to turn toward Foucault’s concepts of
governmentality, biopower, and discipline to understand this.
Governmentality is an area where power may operate outside of the government and the
government (Gressgård, 2019, 14). Governmentality has been critiqued by Nmbembe Achille
(2003) for assuming that death is simply an unintended consequence of power (Gressgård, 2019,
13). This sounds close to the use of paramilitary militias by the Trump administration. However,
it is not always a destructive or violent force that disorders society. For example, “Scholars
examining these transformations through the lens of governmentality have linked their growing
importance to new rationalities of government that seek to mobilize the capacities of an active
citizenry toward its own self-government. Such strategies rely on the biopolitical constitution of
clearly bounded populations, seeking to optimize choices, desires, and even subjectivities.” (de la
Dehesa, 2017, 265, paraphrasing Bedford 2009, Bang and Esmark, 2009). Thus, governmentality
has been used by scholars like de la Dehesa (2017) to describe how neoliberalism (Gressgård,
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2019) and N.G.O.s have interacted with governments to fulfill governmental responsibility of
H.I.V. management. Indeed, governmentality to these scholars has a clear role over life and
death. However, in more conceptual terms, governmentality would differ from simply allowing
non-governmental actors—ranging from militias to the N.G.O.s to the media to participate in, or
fulfill, a government’s functions.
For Foucault, the practice of creating populations enabled a less-severe liberal state to
emerge. Within this “population…is the pivot which turned the transition from rule based on a
sovereign authority to a ‘governmentalized’ rule which decenters the state under liberalism”
(Curtis, 2002, 506). Furthermore, this is linked to the term “biopolitics.” “Foucault maintained
that there have been two major revolutions in power since the classical age: the development of
biopolitical techniques aimed at the individual body and biopolitical techniques aimed at the
collective or social body. Both sorts of techniques emerge from engagements with ‘population’”
(Curtis 2002, 506). Thus, population enables governmentality, which has the benefits of a handsoff state and a state that controls through other means.
Yet, Foucault’s related idea “biopolitics” relates more to the way that populations are
created.
Foucault defines biopolitics/biopower as a technology of power, implying that it is
invented in a particular time, can incorporate different particular techniques and
inventions, can be deployed flexibly by any agency and transmitted as know-how.
Biopower is for Foucault specifically the technology that enables the control of
populations. It involves techniques as diverse as censuses, ballots, hydrography
and insurance policies, encompassing governmentality.
(Kelly 2010, 4)
As Kelly (2010) mentions, biopolitics is situated to understanding international politics beyond
what the scholarship on N.G.O.s delimits. Biopolitical/biopower enables the population to be
controlled by technologies that are different from blunt power.
Governmentality is fairly fluid in terms of techniques and definitions. For example, to
refer to “a conjunction of ideas and practices,” “government itself,” in a “historically limited
sense,” or to mean “power in general” (Larner and Walters, 2004 in Kelley, 2010, 2). Yet, there
is some consensus that it relates to both a set of practices and biopolitics itself. Foucault's
definition of governmentality “…stresses the ‘ensemble’ of ‘institutions, procedures, analyses
and reflections, calculations, and tactics’ (Foucault, (2004/2007, 108) that made the functioning
of this power-knowledge configuration possible” (French, 2015, 429). The combination of power
and knowledge can create populations. For example, concerning Foucault’s related idea of
“biopolitics,” there is a “…first step of enacting populations through statistical practices. I call
this step biopolitical bordering: the delineation of the target population that is to be known”
(Scheel, 2020, 573). In contrast to a nation-state marshaling power and knowledge to create a
population, governmentality can be “government by inaction,” where governments outsource
removal of immigrants from Spain and Ecuador to N.G.O.s thus denying inclusion but not using
the same blunt force as in the United States (Beyers and Nicholls, 2020, 635).
Yet, governmentality works with “visibility” to create knowable and controllable
populations. For example,
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Actually, it is more on the side of making reality knowable that visibility works in
modern governmentality, as Foucault indirectly suggests in his passages on the
emergence of statistics, arguing that this latter “discovers and gradually reveals
that the population possesses its own regularities”. In fact, if visibility is
conceived more broadly in terms of knowledge—a form of knowledge that makes
things and subjects apprehensible and thus governable in some way—it could be
argued that visibility is at the core of governmentality.
(Tazzioli and Walters, 2016, 447, referring to Foucault, 2007)
Tazzioli and Walter (2016) thus link governmentality to Foucault's writing on the disciplinary
society where visibility was more pronounced, hence Foucault’s genealogical work. In the
disciplinary society in Discipline and Punish visibility was about “surveillance.” Thus, there is
potential here to link governmentality back to the disciplinary society and perhaps to points
before since more benign forms of governmentality harken back to disciplinary and further
violent forms of governmental conflict management.
Combining this with the abovementioned discussions of governmentality, it can be seen
that governmentality opens the way not simply for disciplinary power politics but also for people
to be drawn into politics using various methods. At the same time, there is a persistent theme
throughout the abovementioned research that suggests both governmentality and
biopolitics/biopolitics use techniques that require competence. Right-wing populism generally
relies on other reasons for promoting people than competence in bureaucratic management. So,
what would governmentality under right-wing politics look like? Chances are it would constitute
the population through lies and fake news and by blunt violence. This leaves open room to
consider how power may play a role in governmentality, in particular, more manipulative violent
power that characterizes the conflict over right-wing populism in general and Covid-19 in
specific. Are we not in a reverse situation moving backward, away from biopolitics toward blunt
sovereign power? Indeed, the intersection of race, ethnicity, and epidemics raises some troubling
issues about the combination of knowledge and violence.
Research done before Covid-19, at least in hindsight, foreshadows some of the racist antiimmigrant policies in the wake of Covid-19. With a backlash politics return to anti-politically
correct discourse, there were metaphorical justifications for closing borders that were persuasive
and influential before the Covid-19 virus. The use of metaphors to describe immigrants in North
America includes immigrants as bringers of disease (Adeyanju and Neverson, 2007), strange
natural phenomena threatening a homeland (Santo Anna 2002.), or environmental pollutants
(Cisneros, 2008). It is not that these are true or even good explanations, but instead, they have
influenced the public to act.
THEORETICAL APPROACH
This article situates internal borders within the context of right-wing populism and other forms of
right-wing governance in democratic governments. The term right-wing populism is used with
some caution as a useful term to point to a shifting phenomenon though one with little potential
to predict the exact nature of the evolving political realities. This article uses a theoretical
approach based on genealogical situation, which is a “form of investigations that record the
contingencies of power arrangement” showing that they are in flux and “the emergence of
(among other things) new subjects” (Foucault, 2007, and 1978 in Shapiro 2016, 7). Politicians’
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use of ethnonationalism as a quick-fix for the Covid-19 crisis portends that our era is in danger
of producing a future where people will voluntarily accept authoritarianism.
At this stage of the Covid-19 pandemic, it does not seem prudent to attempt to make
causal links between things happening and bordering. Many of the governments analyzed here
are known for obscuring information. It seems to be easier to make some generalizations about
public opinion, discrimination, and employment. However, since Covid-19 was less than a year
old at the time of writing, these generalizations are somewhat mercurial. It is not just that
recommendations for dealing with Covid-19 or even basic facts have changed rapidly. Still,
public opinion seems to have a short shelf-life in ratio to changing situations. Therefore, this
article takes a more genealogical approach, looking at things and events that bordering is situated
in (Shapiro, 2016). Matching different xenophobia and internal bordering stages happening now
to Foucault’s ideas of different eras of power helps uncover the impact of current internal
bordering. Put another way, Foucault follows a linear development of power, yet internal
bordering suggests a reversion to previous stages of power identified by Foucault. Hence, for
Foucault, contemporary security is not about restriction, like discipline societies; security “lets
things happen” (2007, 45). Security, in contrast to “discipline,” is not complete but rather “a
matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation,
and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while knowing they
will never be completely suppressed” (Foucault, 2007, 19). However, restrictions or
encouragement of movement during Covid-19 revert to earlier times that Foucault mentions. In
particular, the internal borders amidst calls to return to work, shop, and attend schools with
neither vaccination nor cure to Covid-19 suggest an earlier function of the police that Foucault
(2007) mentions: ensuring economic competition between nation-states (337) and agricultural
profits and labor (342). While much of the work done today is not agricultural, the governments
mentioned are reverting to something similar by not enabling but restricting people for profit.
Thus, understandings of governmentality and discourse should leave room not just for forms of
knowledge and its effects on power but also for brute force and the reversion to practices from
less democratic times. The first stage in this is the reversion from globalization to xenophobic
nationalism occurring in many democracies.
This paper looks at how discourse sets the stage for future developments. However, I do
not claim to know the future. Instead, this paper identifies the potential for the future of rightwing governments' management of Covid-19. Potential here differs from its positive, casual,
everyday sense. That is, “he has the potential to be a great artist.” Instead, potential is often a
constraint on more radical futures (Berardi, 2019). A constraint does not mean that more radical
futures, better frameworks will not arise. But instead, following Berardi (2019), governments set
a potential that constrains futures that need to happen. In short, rather than assuming that the
treatment of oppressed populations during Covid-19 are isolated incidents, it is likely that these
scenarios may continue or worsen. Therefore, they can be theoretically seen as setting the stage
for future developments of bordering. This potential future is likely if these scenarios continue
along their current trajectory. Other alternatives may arise, though, within the temporal
framework of this paper, they have not. An analysis of authoritarian government’s
ethnonationalism provides perspective on the potential trajectory and long-term consequences of
what may happen if right-wing democracies continue their current engagement with
authoritarian-style ethnocentric scapegoating in the Covid-19 era.
Authoritarian governments may self-describe as oppressed to gain active citizen-support
to oppress less powerful groups. Thus, rather than military or police intervention,
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governmentality may be a tool of authoritarianism. One way authoritarian leaders shore up
power is using ethnicity. which has the dual function of placing people in a hierarchy (even if
ethnicity is voluntary) (Bretell, 2007, paraphrased in Toohey, 2012) and the buy-in of a group
who can feel a sense of continuity (Hall, 1996). The People’s Republic of China has solidified
power (of the dominant Han ethnicity) over regions bordering the Korean peninsula by
undermining the ethnic-based power of Korean diaspora and immigrant populations (Bourdais
Park 2017). In the Western half of China, the Han ethnicity’s territorial power has been solidified
through genocidal practices against Uyegers and Tibetans and by claiming a threat from the
indigenous populations there while at the same time amplifying the narrative that China was a
victim of colonization (Anand, 2019). This is an example of an authoritarian regime using a real,
though finished, history of colonial victimization simultaneous to an ethnonationalist politics that
colonize others. There are echoes of this in right-wing democracies that simultaneously push a
narrative of the victimization of the dominant national group while victimizing oppressed ethnic
groups. Many right-wing democracies mix narratives of “the people” being oppressed by
perceived outsiders simultaneously to internal racism, sexism, homophobia, and violent foreign
policy. Another issue that Bourdais Park (2017) mentions is that ethnonationalist pressure to
disavow identity may exist even where formal rules promote territorial autonomy for oppressed
identity groups. Thus, ethnonationalism offers a temporally shifting, unreliable protection for
oppressed minorities. Thus, the duration of benefits and hostilities suggests inconsistency in how
ethnonationalism interacts with less powerful groups.
In the Middle East, ethnic minorities that will lose status following democratization may
support authoritarian regimes, even though they are not in the majority (Belge and Karakoç.
2015). Many Egyptian and Christians chose whether or not to align with a seemingly protective
Muslim-dominated, authoritarian governments based on various factors other than religious
identity (Farha and Mousa, 2015). In this way, ethnic groups that seem to be receiving little in
return at first glance may support authoritarianism. Both authoritarian and democratic Egypt has
consistently supported neoliberalism by combining appeals to secularism and the conservative
Islamic identity (Sobhy, 2015). This involved the self-directed activities of Egyptians rather than
top-down state directives (Sothby, 2015) and is, therefore, governmentality. Yet, Egypt’s
governmentality is not purely ethnonationalist. This governmentality engages with ethnoreligious
minorities. During the initial waves of democratization, the Coptic Orthodox Church engaged in
governmentality with diaspora communities (Brinkerhoff, 2019). This engagement augmented
the majority-Muslim Egyptian government's reach outside of Cairo (Brinkerhoff, 2019).
Governmentality’s support of authoritarianism, or authoritarian elements of democracy, does not
prevent voluntary participation. Ethno-nationalist governmentality may be successful outside of
the dominant ethnic or religious group that it promotes. Moreover, ethnonationalist governance
may impede official democratization or persist into a democratic government.
The blurring of contradictory categories in ethnonationalism is not simply limited to
Muslim-majority countries. These contradictory categories exist in the politics of countries that
are at least nominally democratic. For example, in Serbia, ethnonationalism was used as a
“schizoid border” that simultaneously confronts and supports capitalist globalization
(Musabegovic, 2019, 374). Legal systems, a hallmark of democracy, have been used for antiMuslim politics in democratic countries such as India and authoritarian countries; this is to some
extent an after-effect of colonialism that has been “reassembled” after the Cold War (Koch and
Vora, 2020, 2). Thus, anti-democratic practices have long histories and potentially long futures
that are hard to undo.
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Authoritarian and democratic strategies have blurred in right-wing democracies'
responses to Covid-19 (Toohey, 2021). One aspect of this is using ethnonationalist tropes to
sidestep democratic processes by drumming up support to ignore public opinion. The potential of
linking the oppressed minorities in struggles to stop right-wing populism or to create
democratization may thus be limited. These limitations can be seen in ethnonationalist politics in
Authoritarian countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and the People’s Republic of China.
Ethnonationalism in Authoritarian countries may not differ so much from racism in
countries like America. Violence against people because of ethnicity is similar to racist violence
in its conceptualization and execution (Balibar, 1991; Toohey, 2012). Moreover, racism has long
since stopped relying on old White-supremacist frameworks like biology and eugenics (Miles
1987) and thus can claim not to be racist when criticized. Therefore, ethnonationalism in
Authoritarian countries, which many right-wing democracies claim to be a threat, is conceptually
similar to emerging right-wing populism. Thus, short-term uses of ethno-nationalist
governmentality are not simply quick fixes to the current Covid-19 crisis, i.e., a necessary evil
that would not be used in better times. The groups that are the target of this Othering are placed
on a lower rung of national hierarchies. As per everyone in these countries, targetting of
oppressed ethnic groups and political enemies build upon past policies and are a potential that
limits the ability of people in the future to move beyond ethnonationalism.
SCAPEGOATING FOREIGN COUNTRIES:
THE BEGINNING OF INTERNAL BORDERS IN THE COVID-19 ERA
Japan, Australia, Brazil, and the United States have had varying degrees of success in dealing
with the spread of Covid-19. Australia has been successful, whereas Japan appears successful,
and the United States and Brazil are not. All four countries are more similar in their overall
motivation that politicians may have for resorting toward xenophobia and borders. Right-wing
politicians in these countries either have rhetoric or policy that does just that. Japanese,
Australian, and U.S. citizens often distrust how foreign countries and institutions are handling
Covid-19. Within this context, an appeal to bordering is not surprising.
Japanese peoples’ fears of economic problems do not differ during the Covid-19 crisis
compared with the 2008-2009 economic downturn (Mordecai and Schumacher, 2020). In Japan,
the economy has been bad since the early 1990s. According to the Pew Research Center
(Mordecai and Schumacher 2020), 85% of people were critical of the Japanese economy in 2008
and 2020. Japan’s static view of the economy differs from Australia, which views the economy
much more negatively, and the United States, where most people view the economies slightly
more positively (ibid). However, all three countries have negative views of the economy. Japan
differs from the United States because the opposition party was in power during the 2008
economic recession, whereas the conservative Liberal Democratic Party is in power during the
Covid-19 crisis. This difference may influence a focus on the economy at the expense of the
Covid-19 crisis, as may the fact that the current ruling party does not have to fix the economic
crisis; it just has to provide the illusion of doing so.
Indeed, the Covid-19 Crisis can easily be blamed on foreign countries. In a speech, then
Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe said Covid-19 came from China, the United States, and
Europe (Abe, May 14, 2020). Abe later stressed the uniqueness of Japan’s strategies, explained
that citizens of many other countries would be prohibited from entering Japan, critiqued “the
strict lockdowns in Europe and the United States,” and said Japan’s economy could not recover
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without the global economy recovering (Abe, May 25, 2020). Merely blaming the United States
would not fit the Japanese peoples’ perspective on how well other countries are handling Covid19. For example, 55% of Japanese people think Japan is doing a good job handing Covid-19
well, versus 15% for the United States, 24% for the World Health Organization, 34% for the
European Union, and 16% for China (Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey in Wike, Fetterolf
and Mordecai 2020). Australia gave similar scores for the U.S. handling of the Covid-19 crisis
and 94% positive ratings for its own policy versus relatively low marks for the European Union,
World Health Organization, and the Peoples’ Republic of China. The median positive rating for
the United States was 15% (ibid). The median positive rating for peoples’ own countries was
74% (ibid). Therefore, Japan had an average negative rating for the U.S. handling of Covid-19
and a lower than usual positive rating for its handling of Covid-19. In many ways, politicians in
Japan had something to gain by criticizing foreign countries' handling of Covid-19 since their
citizens gave the Japanese government a mediocre evaluation compared to other countries'
citizens. These statistics do not prove motives on the part of the Abe Administration, just a
potential benefit of appealing to xenophobia. As per the Australian government, xenophobic
aspects of quarantine have not correlated with public criticism of its Covid-19 policy. Instead,
the Australian Covid-19 policy received high marks from its citizens. But what of the United
States?
Donald Trump frequently makes highly critical comments about China, blaming it for
spreading the Covid-19 pandemic in the United States. Data shows that Americans were primed
to receive this type of message before Covid-19. China's unfavorable rating amongst Americans
has risen from 35% in 2005 to 73% in 2020 (Silver, Devlin, and Huang, 2020). The unfavorable
rating toward China is more prevalent amongst Republicans and Americans over 50 years old
(Silver, Devlin, and Huang, 2020). This, however, does not mean that Americans necessarily
believe that China, not Trump, is responsible for the handling of Covid-19. More Americans
trust the Centers for Disease Control than the Trump administration for information about Covid19 (Survey of U.S. Adults Conducted Aug. 31, Sept. 7, 2020, in Jurkowitz, 2020). These
relatively positive evaluations of The Center for Disease Control may or may not signal a decline
in right-wing populism as “the news media in general” received slightly lower scores than “local
news media” and The Centers for Disease Control” (ibid). The Center for Disease Control was
the only institution surveyed in America to receive more than 50% public confidence on the
issue of Covid-19 (ibid). These statistics present a mixed message regarding Americans'
confidence in its government’s handling of the Covid-19 crisis, which simultaneously supports
and contradicts right-wing populism.
Donald Trump, a quintessential example of a right-wing populist leader, received low
amounts of trust; however, a slight majority of Americans trusted the experts at The Centers for
Disease Control, which, in a right-wing populist narrative, would be the Other, the elite. The
news media similarly received more trust than Trump, but not a majority. Therefore, the upshot
is that blaming China has not convinced most Americans, but only a slight majority trust
expertise. In a context where a slight majority of Americans have typically decided U.S.
elections and where the Trump Administration only aims to convince about 20% of Americans,
this does not suggest U.S. right-wing populism's demise. Moreover, it does not suggest that the
Trump administration would be motivated not to blame China for the spread of Covid-19 in the
United States.
In sum, one aspect of public opinion that may promote bordering is unfavorable views of
other countries, especially regarding their handling of Covid-19. Japanese people gave a

34

David E. Toohey

mediocre appraisal of their domestic Covid-19 policies, coupled with generally bad views of
other countries and the World Health Institution. Thus, not surprisingly, Japan has blamed other
countries. The issue of a sluggish economy, which Covid-19 could ruin, has made it more likely
that scapegoating foreign countries, rather than national quarantines, are preferred policies.
Australian politicians seem to risk little from xenophobic or nationalist fallout from its Covid-19
policies, even if they increase international borders. While Americans may not trust Trump
overall on his Covid-19 policy, most do not like China’s policy. However, the latter varies with
generational divides. Thus, for the time being, bordering may be an expected option for these
three countries to deal with Covid-19.
SCAPEGOATING OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
AS SOMETHING BEYOND SHIFTING THE BLAME
It may be useful to ask why is bordering in the face of Covid-19 significant? After all, it is
somewhat expected. Right-wing countries tend to demonize an enemy; the governments studied
all promote distrust of immigrants and undocumented immigrants. Therefore, it is hardly
unexpected that they would look toward a foreign threat to cover-up Covid-19, which very few
countries have managed to control. However, this sets the stage for a few problems.
The first problem is Covid-19 has continued to rise in these countries even after the
international scapegoats have left. Therefore, the question becomes what to do? If these countries
remain on the same policy track, governmentality must proceed in a different direction. If
Chinese tourists are a visible presence in American or Japanese cities, they are an easy target for
politicians. Chinese tourists do not vote in American or Japanese cities and do not necessarily
visit upon the expectation of being liked. In sum, politicians are given a population to scapegoat
with a low risk of retaliation, at least at the voting booths. When borders are closed, and travel
restrictions are in place, there ceases to be a completely foreign threat to blame. Yet, right-wing
governments look for a threat with different characteristics than the privileged part of the
population, which is where one of the dangers lies. As Achille Mbembe mentions, scapegoating
foreign populations under anti-terrorism members can be satisfied even if it does not find the
precise perpetrator: a resemblance is enough (2016, 53). In sum, there can be a quick transition
from Chinese tourists who recently arrived from an area with a high Covid-19 infection rate to
Chinese Americans who may have never been to China to Japanese Americans and other Asian
Americans. For the sake of analysis, another ethnic or racial group can be substituted for Chinese
Americans. Suffice to say, the scapegoating of foreign people leads to the scapegoating of
citizens within the country. These citizens are scapegoated based on stereotypes with no factual
basis, which is standard fare for right-wing governance. However, these are the nation-states’
citizens within the nation-states’ territory, and the implications are a tolerated breaking up of the
nation-state's citizenship privileges.
The second reason that the scapegoating of foreign countries can cause a national
dissolution is that the scapegoating does not start from the most unwelcome group. Some
Japanese and Americans may recent tourists from China, yet unlike undocumented immigrants,
The U.S. Immigrant and Customs Agency does not hunt down and deport Chinese tourists.
Indeed, in the United States and Japan, they are encouraged to come and are valued for
contributing to tourist economies. Likewise, many of these countries want some international
prestige. In short, this sets precedence to go beyond the simple racism embedded in the politics
of The United States, Japan, Brazil, and Australia, which devalues immigrants and minorities.
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Thus, there is a precedent for a conflict with people who are slightly different but with a
recognized contribution to society. Scapegoated people do not pose a long-term source of
conflict. They may only be around for two weeks. Thus, this spatial cleansing, the setting up of
governmentality over a group of people likely to leave in a short period of time, though not
before noticeably contributing to the economy, sets the stage to be less tolerant of citizens from
different identity groups and political persuasions who will be around permanently.
Though more speculative, the idea of using borders to make us safe from an outside
disease becomes more problematic if we cannot use a foreign border. Permanent, foreign borders
are not the only type of borders. Indeed, borders need be neither permanent nor of long duration.
The U.S.-Mexico border has changed significantly since the U.S.-Mexico War in 1848. This
border shifted slightly in terms of territory, though significantly in terms of indigenous groups
with the 1854 Gadsden Purchase. But border structures—walls, gates, etc.—shift in subtle ways
with seismic forces, decay, and the passage of time (see Nail, 2016, 6). Borders may also be
internal in how people process borders far away from the border, which is anti-immigrant
sentiment or support of borders thousands of kilometers away from a border (Amoore and Hall,
2010; Shachar, 2019; Jones, 2012). Borders also exist between racial groups in physical ways,
such as creating parkways that further divide cities into White and African-American
neighborhoods (Caro, 1975) or the redlining of African American neighborhoods using red pens
on maps, which have created racial poverty. In sum, to elicit international borders to deal with
the anxiety and misery of Covid-19 is not merely to lash out at foreign nations. It is the potential
to spread border conflicts within nation-states. These borders need not be barriers perse but can
be municipal boundaries marked on maps or social ideas of an inside or outside that function in
ways similar to bordering.
Coupled with the abovementioned shift from scapegoating people from foreign countries
to citizens whose ancestors immigrated from these disfavored countries, to even people who are
welcome, borders created by blaming other countries for Covid-19 can spread within nationstates. National borders’ inability to protect against the spread of Covid-19 sets the stage for a
potential spread of border-logic within the confines of national borders (Toohey, 2021). In the
face of politicians’ failures to find a solution to Covid-19, borders become a go-to solution. This
go-to solution is the potential that is likely to be utilized in the absence of a foreign scapegoat,
that is, the remainder when right-wing governance cancels out, more substantial solutions. Thus,
those that seem foreign—be it ethnically, racially, or politically, become the scapegoat.
However, rather than strengthening governmental power, this process potentially dissolves the
nation-state.
Determining populations by national citizenship is similar to Foucault’s biopolitics and
biopower (Kelly, 2010) and governmentality (Dehesa, 2017, 265, paraphrasing Bedford 2009,
Bang and Esmark 2009).). Foucault criticized governmentality and discourse for creating
oppressive power structures that sort and control populations and create power through
normalcy. However, the responses to Covid-19 do not rely on normalcy. Indeed, they succeed
with a certain amount of destabilization in the context of “disorder words” that characterize
Trumpism (Toohey, 2018). Thus, the violence of citizens, rather than the hypocritical negative
peace (see Galtung, 1990) of nation-states, enforces the horizon of international scapegoating
and its potential for the internal divisions of nation-states.
CONCLUSIONS
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This paper has argued that scapegoating foreign countries and citizens to solve Covid-19 has
caused something akin to Foucault’s governmentality but less about solidifying national unity.
Scapegoating foreign countries, that is, blaming China or another country for the spread of
Covid-19, seems to be an obvious go-to solution for right-wing governments. This behavior is
part and parcel of the right-wing populists’ us-vs-them playbook (Mudde, 2004, Mudde, 2018;
Müller, 2017). However, the implications are not so obvious, at least in comparison to these
governments' bellicose nationalist rhetoric. Instead of a national coming together, albeit with
some unhappy losers, the scapegoating of foreign countries and international populations sets the
stage for the scapegoating of minorities, which may seem obvious, but also more unexpectedly
for the scapegoating of more privileged people of different political persuasions.
The first stage of this process is to set tighter borders and even ban travel from certain
countries with high degrees of Covid-19 infections to criticize people who may look like citizens
of a disfavored country with a high infection rate. However, unlike these ethnic minorities, these
groups, usually tourists, are valued because of their economic contributions to tourist economies
and usually short stays. To point this out is not to say that they should be valued, whereas
immigrants should not. What is at stake here is two things: 1) once these foreign tourists leave, it
is easy to blame people from the same ethnicity, hence rising anti-Asian-American xenophobia
in the face of Covid-19, and 2) it is easy to blame people who are different but not causing
noticeable problems. The upshot of the second stake is that it is easy to say that people coming
from politically progressive cities may bring Covid-19 to rural areas. While this may be
medically so, the fact of being an urban resident has not been the only reason Covid-19 spread.
In many areas, Covid-19 has more recently spread exponentially in rural areas where people may
not have taken necessary preventive measures (partially due to thinking there was some sort of
border that made them safer than in urban areas). In a possible Post-Covid future, the stakes for
this are that ethnic divisions strengthen hierarchies based on identity (Bretell 2007).
Peoples’ worst fears of authoritarianism may or may not happen in right-wing
democracies. However, a comparison with theories of ethnonationalism elsewhere suggests that
current authoritarian-style ethnonationalism may have a long life, regardless of how effectively
right-wing politicians are. Ethnonationalism can persist, even with the active support of
oppressed ethnic groups (Belge and Karakoç, 2015; Brinkerhoff, 2019; Bourdais Park, 2017;
Sohby, 2015). Nation-states, democratic or otherwise, are based on shared ethnicity, even when
not framed race, particular ethnic group, or religion. This generalized national ethnicity can
apply to diverse nation-states, e.g., “being American” is not just for white Christians. But the
absence of racist calls to national identity does not mean a less racist or ethnocentric national
identity (Miles 1987). What is happening is, even though Covid-19 can infect anyone, certain
groups now have more right to be in specific spaces based on their national affiliation, ethnicity,
or place of residency. Rather than phrasing these rights in ethnonationalism or racist terms, they
are described as ways to protect people from Covid-19, without, or in addition to, more effective
medical practices. Nonetheless, like ethnonationalism and racism, people in these spaces
generally either look the same or have the same customs. Political rhetoric in right-wing
democracies frequently uses these appearances to avoid providing effective counter-measures to
Covid-19.
Like most scapegoating, this scapegoating exists within the context of a near-inevitable
political failure. These countries are suffering both a pandemic and resultant economic decline
rather than returning to a bright era promised by right-wing governments. Most countries,
regardless of their political configuration, do not know what to do. However, right-wing
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governments need a show of strength and control, even in its absence. Scapegoating and
heightening the power of borders provides the potential to give this show. Indeed, Trump’s
border wall does not necessarily stop undocumented immigration along the U.S.-Mexico border,
even if it were possible to construct along the entire U.S.-Mexico border (The Washington Post
Editorial Board, 2019). In short, scapegoating provides a show. However, no matter how racist
right-wing governments have been, their rhetoric goes beyond ethnic and racial minorities to
elites (Mudde, 2004, Mudde, 2018; Müller, 2017). The Other in right-wing governments include
those they disagree with, hence progressives, liberals, etc. Therefore, beyond mere borders,
ethnic groups, or countries they hate, there is room for others to be scapegoated based on
whether they live in cities or have different political beliefs. Since borders have failed—and
right-wing populists do not necessarily conduct racism by complete obliteration of disfavored
racial groups—the horizon can move on to other enemies and other borders within countries.
This phenomenon has happened in all four countries studied (Toohey, 2021).
This paper contributes to Foucault’s theories by showing that the process of using a
definition of a population to shore up power does not necessarily lead to an unchanging group
controlled through stable, albeit unpleasant ways. Indeed, this paper brings in the idea of
population, which can be misinterpreted as stable and unchanging, to a more consistent frame of
Foucault’s genealogy, which accounts for change. Moreover, by incorporating Berardi’s (2019)
idea of current political potentials limiting the horizons of the future, this paper renders
Foucault’s ideas easier to use in interpreting current events. The expected scapegoating of
foreign populations during Covid-19 has unusual characteristics: the simultaneous use of
biopolitics, governmentality, and discipline potentially dissolves national territory and national
populations.
This potential dissolution has precedent but is unusual because there is a shift to make
people want it. Indeed, the creation of a nation—what Benedict Anderson (2006) termed an
imagined community—does not imply national unity in the face of a threat to national prosperity
and survival. People in a right-wing country do not relate to each other as a population after
harsh national and international borders have been set to curb the spread of Covid-19. This
border is failing, and, sans any vaccine, cure, or sufficient economic/work change, another
border will likely be sought. As Grandin (2019) has said, there are no more frontiers to cross, and
the only place for the U.S. to look is inward. This inward gaze may be more longstanding in
other right-wing countries as international travel and migration come to a standstill. All that
pent-up anti-immigrant energy is potentially turned inwards in the absence of credible
alternatives and solutions to right-wing governance and its failure to deal with Covid-19. Yet,
this is not a rational direction that people will necessarily seek on their own. Instead, some power
intervention will enforce it, and governmentality and discourse, which focus on order, may not
be sufficient. Neither may the ramblings of right-wing politicians, which often fail to explain.
Many of these ramblings bear a similarity to proclamations of ethnonationalism by dominant
groups in authoritarian countries that lack legal, ethical, or political consistency and vary in
duration. A focus on governmentality spotlights how the solution to this lies not only in
governments and institutions but also in how peoples’ ability to create a less authoritarian future
is being limited by right-wing democracy’s use of ethnonationalism as a quick-fix to the Covid19 crisis.
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Abstract
Mexico is one of the least peaceful countries in the world. Peace, however, is not limited to
the absence of violence for it includes many other aspects related to attitudes, institutions,
and structures in a society (IEP, 2021). In this regard, the municipality of Ecatepec in the
State of Mexico is an illuminating case study not only for the absence of conditions for
structural peace, but also for the impact this has on the perceptions and conceptions of its
residents. This paper presents the results of qualitative research carried out in Ecatepec at
the request of a dialogue group for peacebuilding. A total of 31 in-depth interviews were
conducted for exploring the perceptions, conceptions, visions, and concerns of a sample of
Ecatepec residents regarding issues such as security, absence of peace, and possibilities for
peacebuilding in the community, and how peacebuilding is envisioned at a local level. The
interviews were fully transcribed and analyzed in detail using the qualitative NVivo
software; subsequently, they were coded using preexisting and emerging categories. The
results revealed a high level of awareness of the structural factors underlying general and
gender-based violence; they also showed the high impact of participants’ own experiences,
and those of people emotionally and physically close to them, in the social construction of
perceptions about high insecurity and about what takes place in the municipality and
country. The findings highlight the relevance of local policy, as well as the impact of
citizen participation and organization in the municipality’s communities due to the
perceived neglect by authorities, and the need to find support and resilience mechanisms in
the absence of basic elements to survive daily life with dignity. Several of the issues that
emerged during the research have global relevance—for example, distrust of institutions.
Therefore, the findings contribute to a better understanding of how peace breaks down and
how it can be built.
Introduction
Mexico is one of the least peaceful countries in the world (IEP, 2021). The strategies
implemented by three different administrations belonging to diverse political parties have
not been effective in reducing the different kinds of violence that have proliferated for at
least the last 15 years. Peace, however, is not limited to the absence of violence for it
includes many other aspects related to attitudes, institutions, and structures in a society
(IEP, 2021). In this regard, the municipality of Ecatepec in the State of Mexico is an
illuminating case study not only for the absence of conditions for structural peace but also
for the impact this has on the perceptions and conceptions of its residents in terms of what
this absence of peace implies and their hope that the situation improves. Therefore, a
national initiative called Méxicos Posibles (literally, “Possible Mexicos”), focused on
strengthening processes of dialogue and collaboration between diverse actors in society,
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decided to study this municipality to explore the conditions for initiating a dialogue in that
area. To this end, it assigned a research project to our team, based on the methodology we
have been using to conduct similar studies for several years.
Given the relevance of the issues that emerged during this qualitative research and
the insights the study can provide about the absence of peace in Mexico, we decided to
present the results in this paper. Several of those issues have global relevance—for
example, how distrust for institutions builds, but, above all, that which essentially arises
from one’s own or very focused experiences and the chasm created between citizens and
authorities. Other aspects of the study concern not only the existing deprivations but also
their exploitation by power groups. Therefore, the results are relevant for not only Mexico
but also contribute to a better global understanding of how peace breaks down and how it
can be rebuilt (or built).
A total of 31 in-depth interviews were conducted to obtain an overview of the
perceptions, conceptions, visions, concerns, and perspectives of a sample of Ecatepec
residents regarding issues such as security, absence of peace and possibilities for
peacebuilding in the community, and how such peacebuilding is envisioned at a local level.
The interviews were fully transcribed and then thoroughly analyzed using the qualitative
NVivo software; subsequently, they were coded using preexisting and emerging categories.
The results showed patterns indicating a high level of citizen awareness of the structural
factors underlying general and gender-based violence; they also revealed the high impact of
one’s own experiences, and those of people one is close to (emotional and physical
proximity), and daily conversations—in contrast to the role of the mass media, for
example—in the social construction of perceptions about high insecurity and about what
takes place in the municipality and country. The findings highlight the role of citizen
participation and organization in the municipality’s communities due to distrust of the
government, perceived neglect by authorities, and the need to find support and resilience
mechanisms in the absence of basic elements to live with dignity. Our recommendations are
aimed at shaping a dialogue process that considers these elements and actors, which could
be relevant for other similar cases.
We first present some details about the dialogue group for peacebuilding Méxicos
Posibles, as well as background information on Ecatepec. Next, we describe the
methodology, general results, and more specific results based on the issues that emerged.
Finally, we discuss the results and provide recommendations for a dialogue process in a
context such as the one described.
About the dialogue group for peacebuilding in Ecatepec
Méxicos Posibles was established in 2015, formed by a diverse group of Mexicans with the
main objective of promoting solid institutions and a culture of legality and strengthening
the rule of law. As indicated on its official website, the organization hired “Reos Partners,
an international consulting firm with extensive experience in solving complex problems in
countries such as South Africa, Colombia, Canada, and Guatemala, and related to issues
such as sustainability, energy, and education. Its methodology, Transformative Scenario
Planning and Elastic Collaboration, allows actors with radically different visions to build a
shared understanding of reality to subsequently carry out actions that lead to the most
desirable scenario” (Méxicos Posibles, 2018).
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To implement the same methodology at a local level, a small group comprising
members of this organization was formed, with the aim of promoting peacebuilding
processes in specific locations of the country. The most important aspect of this group is its
emphasis on processes, in the promotion of and training in dialogue, bonding, and cohesion
to gradually initiate discussion on central issues of the peacebuilding agenda in Mexico.
With that in mind, the group selected the municipality of Ecatepec in the State of Mexico
(26 km from the center of Mexico City) for starting its work.
For this, it was decided to prepare an exploratory diagnosis based on a series of indepth interviews with various actors in the municipality. The purpose of these interviews
was to obtain an overview of the perceptions, conceptions, visions, concerns, and
perspectives of individuals in the localities where the dialogue group will work on issues
such as security, absence of peace, and possibilities for peacebuilding in the community,
and how those actors conceive peacebuilding at a local level. The emergence of concerns
not related to violence or peace (only in appearance) was also considered—for example,
concerns about lack of water or other services, or urban mobility problems. Another reason
for conducting the interviews was to obtain names of possible candidates who could
participate in the abovementioned peace dialogue.
Some basic information about Ecatepec
Ecatepec is inhabited by 1.6 million people, that is, the most populated municipality in the
State of Mexico and one of the most populated in the country (INEGI, 2021). Of this
population, 28.4% has a high school degree as the highest degree, and only 17.4% of the
population has a bachelor's degree (DataMéxico, 2021).
The 2020 Population and Housing Census indicated that 355,000 people sought
health care services outside the municipality (DataMéxico, 2021). The sector that
concentrated the most economic units in Ecatepec was retail trade with 50.4%; the services
sector corresponds to 27.2% of the economic units (DataMéxico, 2021).
According to the Flood Atlas published by the Water Commission of the State of Mexico
(CAEM), Ecatepec is one of the two municipalities most prone to flooding, which includes
six locations prone to urban flooding (Government of the State of Mexico, 2021).
One of the biggest problems in Ecatepec is the lack of potable water. The problem is
so serious that around 800,000 people who live in the fifth zone of Ecatepec, in the south of
the municipality, have been living without water in their houses for years. To survive, the
families in the area must pay from 100 to 160 pesos per thousand liters of water, which is
enough for less than a week of regular use of water for four people. In response to this
situation, around 1,600 families from 47 “barrios” or neighborhoods in Ecatepec filed a
lawsuit for water shortage in May, 2020 (Adam, 2021).
There is also a sector of the population that does not have access to other services
such as sewerage, bathroom, and electricity (DataMéxico, 2021). Among the basic services
provided by the municipality, there have also been problems with garbage collection, with
the municipal transport network, and with drainage.
Ecatepec is commonly known as a "bedroom city" since, due to the lack of job
opportunities, many people are forced to travel daily for work. According to the data
provided by the 2020 population and housing census, the average time to travel from home
to work was 51.9 minutes, but 31.4% of the population takes more than an hour to get to
work, which may include up to four hours commutes (DataMéxico, 2021).
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Poverty is one of the most problematic issues that afflicts this municipality.
According to data from the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development
Policy, in 2019 Ecatepec topped the national list of municipalities with the highest rate of
urban poverty with 786,843 people living in poverty (Suárez, 2019).
Furthermore, Ecatepec is the third municipality with the highest perception of
insecurity in Mexico, according to the results of the National Survey of Urban Public
Safety (ENSU). In this period, 87.7% of the people surveyed in the State of Mexico
indicated that they felt unsafe (Martínez, 2021).
Conceptual framework
This research used the methodology employed in a series of previous studies, which were
based on a holistic view of structural peace (Galtung, 1985; Alger, 1987). This theoretical
perspective argues that negative peace—that which should not exist for a society to be
considered at peace—is the absence of violence as well as the fear of it. Conversely,
positive peace comprises factors that constitute, activate, and sustain peace. The Institute
for Economics and Peace (IEP) has conducted research that demonstrates the existence of
eight basic areas or indicators in the most peaceful societies worldwide, known as the eight
pillars of peace, or to put it in other words, the DNA of peace: “(a) a well-functioning
government, (b) equitable distribution of resources, (c) free flow of information, (d) good
neighborly relations (or social cohesion [author’s note]), (e) high levels of human capital,
(f) acceptance of the rights of others, (g) low levels of corruption, and (h) a solid business
environment” (IEP, 2018, 52).
Of all the components of negative and positive peace, our previous studies have
focused on two central issues: (a) fear and its psychosocial effects in Mexico, and (b)
perceived absence of the free flow of information. These issues are important because
evidence shows that the prevalence of fear and stressful environments tends to have
negative impacts on issues such as democracy, inclusion, respect for the rights of others,
tolerance, trust in democracy and justice institutions, and, in general, support for peace
processes (Bateson, 2009; Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009; Carreras,
2013; Ceobanu, Wood, & Ribeiro, 2012; Demombynes, 2009; IEP, 2018, 2019; Ley, 2014;
Morris, 2012, 2013; Siegel, 2007; Wilson, 2004; Wolf, 2016).
With that in mind, we carried out an exploratory study in 2011–2012 on the
incidence of symptoms suggestive of post-traumatic stress disorder in the Mexican
population (Meschoulam & Calderón-Abbo, 2019, 50). Subsequently, we carried out a
series of four qualitative studies using hundreds of interviews and a quantitative study in a
nationally representative sample (Meschoulam et al., 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2020). The
following were the main findings of this series of investigations:
A. The major components of the participants’ social construction of their
perceptions and conceptions of the violence in their country and the possibilities
for peace were their own experiences, and those of people close to them, their
own observation, and their conversations with friends, family, colleagues, and
associates. These three categories alone comprised more than 60% of the
content of the issues the participants discussed during the interviews.
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B. The above showed an important contrast with the print media, radio, and
television as social constructors—these three emerged much less frequently as
elements influencing the participants’ perceptions and conceptions of violence
and peace. This did not mean that traditional media were not used but rather that
the participants indicated that, compared with their own experiences,
observations, and conversations with people they trusted, these media were not
reliable sources of information and knowledge about what was happening in the
country. Instead, the participants expressed many negative feelings such as
anger, rejection, and even rage toward the media, which they perceived as part
of the corrupt system that, in their opinion, characterizes Mexico.
C. Similarly, the major social constructor of the feeling of fear or terror—one of
the most recurring issues in the interviews—was the participants’ own
experiences, and those of people close to them, and conversations. However,
according to them, the media also played an important role in spreading fear as
they were sensationalistic, showed too much violence, and intentionally spread
terror to control public opinion for their or the government’s interests
(Meschoulam et al., 2017).
D. The distance participants claimed to have put between themselves and
traditional media such as the two main television networks, most listened radio
stations, and most read newspapers in the country was related to two main
factors: (1) their distrust of these media based on the perception that they were
manipulated by the government (whom the participants greatly mistrusted) or
the country’s power elites and were, therefore, part of the structure of
corruption, crime, and violence; and (2) the negative feelings that, in their
opinion, the media triggered in them, such as anger, stress, anguish, fear,
hopelessness, and apathy, through sensationalism, excessive exhibition of
violence and blood, and the lack of respect for the victims of the situation in
Mexico in the years these interviews were conducted.
The results of our quantitative study (Meschoulam et al., 2020) confirmed most of
these patterns in a national sample.
The research carried out in Ecatepec in 2021 was based on this conceptual
framework and adopted a methodology similar to the one used in the abovementioned
studies by developing a protocol tailored to that municipality and based on research
questions specific to this project.
Research questions
The following questions guided the present research:
A. Which are the major concerns of a sample of Ecatepec residents regarding the
absence of peace or peacebuilding in their community and why?
B. Which other concerns emerge, even if they are not apparently linked to violence or
peace?
C. Which could be some basic ideas that could help conduct the first peace dialogue
workshop?
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D. Who could be the key actors to be invited to the workshop?
E. Which are the key issues of the peacebuilding agenda that should be discussed
during the workshop?
Methodology

A total of 31 in-depth interviews were conducted with Ecatepec residents. Of these, 29
were conducted in the traditional manner (interviewer-interviewee); one was of a journalist
from the municipality, interviewed by several members of Méxicos Posibles together; and
one was of two residents together.
Participants and sampling strategy
A purposive sampling strategy was used that, though did not represent the municipality’s
entire population, sought the greatest possible diversity. The sample comprised 18 men and
14 women—of these, six were in the 18–24 age group, 23 in the 25–59 age group, and three
were aged over 60. To ensure diversity, residents having varied incomes and occupations
were selected (some participants are included in more than one category): seven civil
society activists, three retailers, three teachers, four parents, two political activists, one
blacksmith, two factory workers, one housewife, one communicator, one school
administrative staffer, three students, one working with a development foundation, three
members of civil associations, one member of a religious association, one pastor, two
priests, one industrial plumber, one nurse, one policeman, one mechanic, three former
prisoners, one working at a stationery store, one tow truck driver, one mechanical engineer,
and one journalist.
The ethical and legal processes of contacting and recruiting participants and
conducting the study were supervised by the Mexico Research Center for Peace (CIPMEX,
AC) for absolute compliance with the Mexican Law on the Protection and Security of Data
and Information. Each interviewee signed an informed consent form prior to their
interview.
Data collection
Data were collected in 27 interviews conducted via Zoom and four carried out in person in
the municipality. Zoom was used for logistic, security, and health reasons, considering the
COVID-19 pandemic. Several tests were performed to ensure that the results derived from
the Zoom interviews did not differ from those derived from the face-to-face ones.
Data analysis
The data analysis method of previous studies carried out by CIPMEX (Meschoulam et al.,
2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2020) was adopted. The interviews were fully transcribed and then
analyzed using the qualitative NVivo software—several preexisting categories derived
from two pilot interviews with key stakeholders from the municipality and from previous
literature and research were used. Words, sentences, or entire paragraphs were coded within
these categories to detect patterns and repetitions, as well as possible emerging
categories—the latter were some of the most recurring in the study. Saturation of the main
categories was observed in the initial interviews—this pattern was maintained, with slight
variations, until the completion of all interviews.
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Reliability
The study’s reliability was ensured by using various methods to control bias: (a) the
interviews were conducted by 12 different researchers and the analyses were performed by
nine—repetitions and patterns in the results were nevertheless confirmed; (b) we
interviewed, as indicated above, residents from varied socioeconomic strata; (c) the data
collected were shared and verified by the whole team to minimize potential individual
biases; and finally, (d) the results were compared with those obtained in previous
investigations to confirm consistency in the patterns—all patterns were confirmed despite
the described control measures.
Limitations and transferability
Despite the sample’s diversity, the results cannot be transferred to the entire Mexican
population, or even to the entire population of Ecatepec—they exclusively concern the 32
interviewees (of our 31 interviews). However, the repetition of patterns detected throughout
the process was quite high; therefore, although not conclusive, the findings do seem to
highlight initial indications about how the process of social construction of the
interviewees’ perceptions of violence and peace in their municipality is shaped. The
patterns detected in this study can well be the basis for a series of hypotheses that could be
tested in the future through quantitative research with larger samples, both in this
municipality and other parts of Mexico or elsewhere.
Therefore, what we have is a series of first signs that allow us to understand the
issues of greatest concern in Ecatepec; which could be the key aspects on the peacebuilding
agenda for that municipality; the actors that should participate in the dialogue; and clues on
how fear is socially built and, perhaps, on how to reverse the process or at least mitigate
that fear.
Results
This section presents the study results. The first part presents the overall results. In the
second part, the results have been disaggregated by issue/topic—that is, under the six main
topics used for a closer analysis of the detected patterns: A. Issues related to violence and
peace, B. Gender-related issues, C. Socioeconomic issues, D. Sociopolitical issues, E.
Issues related to authorities or the government, and F. Major deprivations and problems in
daily life.
General Overview
This table summarizes the 10 most recurring categories in the interviews.

Categories
Structural peace or structural
violence
Personal experience
Insecurity

Number of coding
references

Proportion of interviewees
mentioning it at least once

277

100%

242
242

93.6%
100%
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Citizen or community
participation or organization
Ineffectiveness of authorities
Key actors for dialogue
Corruption
Social and economic gender
inequality
Crime in general
Fear or terror
Table 1.0: Overall results

231

96.8%

214
192
160
138

100%
80.7%
87.1%
74.2%

135
130

87.10%
96.77%

These results can be summarized as follows:
Social constructors: Personal Experience
This refers to the main mechanisms the interviewees used to socially construct their
perceptions, ideas, values, and opinions about what was happening in their environment
and country.
The category Personal Experience emerged constantly in our previous research
(already validated in a national quantitative study, see Meschoulam et al., 2020).
Participants from our studies have tended to talk mainly about their own experiences, and
those of people close to them, their observations, and what they talk about with their
neighbors, colleagues, or acquaintances. These elements tend to be trusted much more as
sources of information and social construction of perceptions and values than others such as
traditional media or even social networks.
Ecatepec was no exception. In the present investigation, this category recurred on
242 occasions (hereinafter, frequency, or f) during the interviews. Ninety four percent of
the interviewees spent a big part of the conversation to tell us about their own experiences
or those of people close to them—these included stories, anecdotes, or aspects of their own
life and those of their family, friends, colleagues, and associates to exemplify, validate, and
confirm what they told us. Here are some examples that illustrate this recurrence:
Look, I don't even know what to think… In November my husband came at 1:30
AM, he went to the wine shop for his soda. A Hummer Van came…no…a Black
Wolf Van, and took him up. They took him and a boy who was there. We never
thought we could ever ride inside such a luxurious van. They took them both up,
and they took money from them because the other boy had just taken money out of
an ATM, they were following him and they thought my husband was with him.
They threw them into Leilani's territory, and they had to walk back here. They left
them at Tecámac and they returned at 3:00 AM, it was an express kidnapping.
(Retail Trader)
I have heard so many things from close family members, from friends, who have
been victims of crime, as I myself was a victim at the time. They assaulted me ...
they had a pickaxe, it seems to me, the truth is that I didn't really know what
weapon it was, but apparently it was a knife, a pickaxe, I don't know what it was.
And well, they took my things, my money, this ... they also even tried to grope me.
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The person I was with was also robbed ... And so were my relatives, well, not all of
them, but unfortunately, they have also been victims of crime and well, yes, that's
why everybody is afraid. (Student)
The state policemen, trust me, they have earned their bad name very heartily. Once I
was walking, that is, imagine, I was walking! I had no alcoholic beverages, I had no
drugs of any kind, I had my IDs ... they (policemen) detained me. Because I was
“making noise on the street”. And now, I say, “Well, let's see, show me your report,
right?” Just to know, if it came from a person who is pointing out that it is me ...
They wanted to put me in jail for theft. When I arrived at the public prosecutor's
office, I was accused of stealing with a knife, a knife that I didn´t even have on me
... And just in one moment, my life was going to change. (Industrial plumbing
worker)
I think that what we are experiencing are very unfortunate conditions because
practically one can no longer lead a normal life, because we are afraid of doing
things, well, I don't know, we are afraid of going to a university, doing our daily
things. Because there is a lot of fear that you may be assaulted, or you may be the
victim of some circumstance beyond your control, so I consider that what we live
here is very regrettable. The truth is that no ... There is a lot of crime and that makes
us feel very insecure. Not only ... mainly women, because Ecatepec is one of the
municipalities with the highest rate of murders, of femicides, so you should be
much more careful when you get on public transport. (Activist)
This recurrence is key in many ways. Among other things, it reveals the importance of
implementing public policy, measures, and actions at a local level that can impact daily life
and citizens’ experiences, not as a replacement for measures implemented at a regional,
state, or national level, but rather along with them. Conversely, if the decision-making does
not have an impact on people’s daily experiences, it is almost impossible to transform
citizens’ perceptions of relevant issues such as their safety and well-being.
Our research team paid much attention to possible mentions about the traditional
media and digital social networks. In line with our previous research, those mentions were
extremely low in number. In summary, the interviewees essentially spoke to us based on
their own perspective and situation (or of those close to them).
Major concerns
Thus, due to personal experiences, and those of their family members and people close to
them, the participants’ most relevant concerns included the feeling of insecurity, with a
high number of mentions of assault and crime in general during the interviews. All this
naturally feeds the feeling of fear or terror, highly prevalent among the interviewees.
This last issue—fear factor—is also key because, in the long run, a peacebuilding
process cannot prosper in an environment marked by fear and tension (see, for example,
Wilson, 2004; Siegel, 2007; Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport, & Hobfoll, 2016), and,
although reducing violence in the municipality is not necessarily among the objectives of
Méxicos Posibles, the issue of fear must be added to the discussion agenda: fighting
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violence is one thing; fighting the fear of violence another, and they do not necessarily walk
in parallel.
It is striking, however, that the concerns the interviewees expressed were closely
accompanied by the feeling that the authorities were ineffective, deeply rooted in their
perception of neglect and excessive corruption. According to them, the authorities had not
only failed to do their job, but had taken advantage of the situation for personal gain,
leaving Ecatepec’s communities to their own fate. Again, this was not something they had
learned through the media but rather through situations they or their relatives or others in
their community had experienced firsthand.
From these concerns emerged three major issues this study focused on, perhaps the
most relevant results:
A. Structural peace and violence
Although the specific terms “structural peace” or “structural violence” were not used by
participants, this was the most recurring issue during the interviews—it emerged 277 times
and all interviewees spoke about it at least once.
As if the interviewees were familiar with the specialized literature on violence and
peace, they tended to describe what happens in their municipality not just as visible or
palpable events of violence, but mainly as a series of structural conditions that trigger this
violence. Thus, they exhibited a high level of awareness of the factors at the root of
violence, such as precariousness, inequality and corruption, political conflict, and power
groups’ neglect of citizenship (absence or weakness of the government), as well as the
exploitation of existing deprivations to profit from people’s needs.
The interviews essentially project a citizenry who understands very well what
happens in their municipality and in the country, a citizenry who understands why this
happens, and who considers that it would be impossible to build peace if the factors that
originate its absence are not properly solved. Consider these interview excerpts:
Well, look, I rather think there are problems, and because of those problems we
have insecurity, not the other way around. So, does security cause other problems?
No. I believe that the problems we already have are the ones that make you feel
insecure. Mainly the lack of jobs, the lack of public institutions to have our young
people studying, the lack of job training because there are those who don’t have
enough money to study, but who could enter a technical school of commerce,
carpentry, bakery, something that may keep young people busy, and that later on,
will produce income so that they, their relatives, don’t have the need to commit
crimes. Come on, there are children who even steal candies; if their parents could
give them some money, at least for a candy, they would no longer steal it. From
there we can start, right? (Municipal Police Officer).
But there you have a phenomenon, the income issue is huge, the issue of
overcrowding too, but you cannot think that the State of Mexico or territories like
Ecatepec have such levels of violence just because there is too many people…We
cannot speak of organized crime if there wouldn’t exist a political arm, a business
arm, a criminal arm, then there are a series of issues related to the mafias that
generate highly violent dynamics with no way out. (Activist)
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…Because without human rights, that is, if we cannot satisfy our basic needs… or,
how do you think we could engage each other peacefully? In other words, if we
don’t have an education for peace and human rights education, how can you learn to
mediate our daily conflicts? (Community Center Collaborator)
Then, unfortunately, those boys are put in jail and they keep them there for almost
eight months, ten months, for stealing a radio from a car. It's wrong, they become
worse in prison. So, what they have to do with those guys is “You know what? Give
back the radio”, and he's going to have to wash the street, I don't know, something
like that. Because, how does an 18-year-old boy end up in prison? They lack
opportunities… (Blacksmith)
B. Citizen participation
Another among the most recurring issues was related to the participation and organization
of Ecatepec residents to address their own problems—it was mentioned 231 times, with
97% of the interviewees referring to it. This was largely due to the perception of a historical
neglect of the municipality by different governments and political actors, the lack of basic
services, and, therefore, the need for the residents to organize themselves to solve their own
problems.
Interviewees provided countless examples showing these factors. Some of them
include the following:
Look, I like to participate. I know some guys, here in the neighborhood, in San
Cristóbal, who like to participate because they are social leaders, those gentlemen.
Those social leaders, with no pay, without asking for anything, they are trying to fix
the problems they see on the streets, and there they go, there they go, although
public officials don’t let them in, they still wait there until someone at the municipal
offices lets them in, which is when they achieve something. (Blacksmith)
People join together; in fact, the other day, the barbecue guy wanted to settle in a
green area in the Americas (a neighborhood) and the neighbors didn’t let him.
Neighbors gathered signatures and they came with the lawyers and drove the people
away from occupying lands, because they should not be establishing there... for
example, here in the neighborhood there are many professional citizens. That is
what gives you a bit of knowledge to be able to demand your rights. (Psychologist)
I have had to organize people. I have had neighbors who organize themselves in
different neighborhoods, they do things, and have done incredible things. It's just a
matter of continuing to build citizenship and giving them more tools. People are
agglutinated through political parties because those have been able to bring people
together. But there is a lot of social material in the communities, there are many
people out there who can do many things, that is like ... they are only eager that they
may have opportunities to be able to do those things and, uh ... voluntarily. I think it
is important to change the discourse, to assess how all these things exist in this
municipality, which is very large and has many problems, but it also has many
talented people. (Foundation Employee)
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There are more female leaders in the neighborhoods, no doubt. People always tell
you about the gossipy lady, right? But we have misclassified them, and people say,
"Oh no, it's the gossipy lady over there, the one who goes around gossiping". And
you say, maybe she is the gossipy lady, but she is the gossipy who solved the water
supply for you, who prevented the power cut off, who got the park fixed, right? I
think that those ladies misnamed "gossipy" are rather community companions...
(Civil Association Official)
What I think right now—and it is because I honestly doubt people who have the
answer to everything—the only thing that I feel is viable, are those processes that
are carried out by the groups that are born from the organizations. (Activist)
For example, the crime issue, the disappearance of a girl or boy, the issue of a
woman who is kidnapped, and her daughter is killed. So, I feel that this is, like, the
potential of the neighborhood, when we come and say, "We are going to have a
meeting". I don´t know… we just say: "We will meet to find a response to this issue
of so many robberies", and people do meet, because they know that it is a common
problem. (Social Worker)
I want to tell you that I have a WhatsApp group, we are not many, we are
approximately 50 colleagues, and we try to act with honesty, with responsibility, we
try to be efficient in our work, and we help each other. The WhatsApp group is for
that, sometimes we need stationery, and we ask each other for it. Sometimes we
need it, we are not all-powerful, and sometimes we need advice, what one colleague
doesn’t know, sometimes the other does. And it is in this way that we have sought
self-help. Sometimes in the absence of coordination with our own police
corporation, we have opted for that, to help each other in every way we can.
(Municipal Police Officer)

C. Issues related to insecurity
Peace is not limited to the absence of violence or the feeling of security, but it does include
them. Negative peace is defined as the absence of violence as well as the fear of it (IEP,
2020). As is evident, these issues are not related only to violence or material crime—they
encompass people perceiving that they live in an unsafe environment; thus, they are not at
peace, and it becomes difficult to build it. These were among the interviewees’ major
concerns—all of them mentioned insecurity at least once, its total mentions being 242,
while 90% cited crime as a major concern.
Results by major issues/topics
To provide a clearer overview of the most recurring issues, we grouped those issues under
six nodal topics and employed a specific approach for each. Below are the most repeated
mentions, under each topic, during the interviews.
A. Issues related to violence and peace
The table below presents the most recurring categories under this topic.
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Categories

Number of coding
references

Structural peace or structural violence

277

Proportion of
interviewees
mentioning it at least
once
100%

Personal experience

242

93.5%

Insecurity

242

100%

Crime in general

135

87.1%

Fear or terror

130

96.8%

Drugs and addiction

111

74.2%

Assaults

101

83.9%

Normalization of violence

95

77.4%

88
Feelings of helplessness, sadness,
frustration, and anger
76
Homicides and murders
Table 2.0: Issues related to violence and peace

71.0%
83.9%

It is worth noting here that, in addition to the most recurring categories mentioned before
(such as structural violence and peace, insecurity, and personal experience), the
interviewees highlighted crime in general and assaults as factors having a daily impact on
them—these were mentioned 135 and 101 times (f) by 26 and 27 interviewees (i.e., 80–
90%). Moreover, the participants showed high concern for drugs and addiction (f=111;
74% mentioned it at least once). For instance:
The truth is that I´ve had many close situations, perhaps not me directly, but with
close relatives, and I consider that the situation is going from bad to worse. Before,
at least you said, well they just mug you, right? and that's it. But now, there is
always something beyond, where they even damage your physical integrity. So, it’s
a worrying situation that is getting worse, no government has achieved any
decrease. Not with the PRD (Democratic Revolution Party), the PRI (Institutional
Revolutionary Party), or the PAN (National Action Party). (Communicologist)
I can tell you that I have met people who were very good at their job, but someone
gave them drugs and then they lived selling drugs even with their children. This is
something that is tremendously affecting our community. (Church Pastor)
Prevalence of the perception that violence has become normalized is especially noteworthy
(f=95; 77% mentioned it at least once). This contributes to negative feelings, including
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helplessness, sadness, frustration, and anger—this was mentioned 88 times during the
interviews by more than 70% of participants. Consider this example:
I have seen it myself, because on several occasions they have left bodies here where
I live. I tell you, in less than four minutes I get to the corner really fast, and
regularly, they leave bodies on the sidewalk, or in the middle of the street. It is
common. One neighbor said, "Well, I really jumped it (a dead body), because I was
on the sidewalk and I preferred to jump it because I was in a hurry" and I said
"Wow, we have reached impressive levels (of normalization)". (Civil Association
Official)
We emphasize these aspects because our previous research (Meschoulam, 2019) has
indicated that it would be difficult to think of a peace dialogue process without concurrently
addressing such negative feelings. This is discussed further below.
B. Gender-related issues
This table presents the most recurring categories under this topic.

Categories

Number of
coding
references

Social and economic gender inequality

138

Proportion of
interviewees
mentioning it at
least once
74%

Structural gender-based violence

127

83.9%

Direct gender-based violence

92

77.4%

Domestic violence

55

67.8%

Femicides
Disruption of routine due to previous
experiences
Patriarchal chauvinist culture

53
40

71.0%
58.1%

33

48.4%

Sexual violations

25

38.7%

Sexual aggression
Table 3.0: Gender-related issues

14

29.0%

As shown in the table above, the most recurring issues during the interviews were
structural, which include gender-related social and economic inequality (f=138; 74%
mentioned it at least once) and gender-based violence (f=127; 84% mentioned it at least
once). This is in line with our research in general: the interviewees’ deep awareness of
systemic factors and causes underlying visible or direct violence, also frequently mentioned
in the case of that based on gender (f=92; 77% mentioned it at least once). What is also
noteworthy is that 71% and 68% of the interviewees mentioned the issues of femicides and
domestic violence at least once. Here are two examples of these categories:
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I also think that their work and accompaniment (of women) is very badly valued.
For example, this thing of saying well she is "the gossipy", instead of saying “She is
the one that accompanies us all, and that she also feels this way”. As she is the
community caretaker, we should value what she does, community caring or
companionship. I think it is very important to state clearly what they do for the
community. (Civil Association Official)
In regards to violence, there is also a lot of violence against women. It is very
common that there are cases of women who have been physically violated, verbally,
or even femicides, or attempted violence, rape or attempted femicide. So, violence
against women is at its highest levels, unfortunately, even in this pandemic, as in
other places, it has worsened but it has been like that for years. Women have been
raped for a long time, right? Nowadays it has become a little more visible due to all
the feminist boom, fortunately. (Community Center Collaborator)
There were several additional issues to consider under this topic.
Two factors stood out when we conducted our tests to compare male and female
interviewees. First, for the most part, the most recurring issues were almost the same for
both, a sign of our results’ internal reliability. However, in line with our previous research,
“fear factor” had a considerably higher frequency among the female interviewees (f=70; all
of the 14 mentioned it at some point) compared with the male interviewees (f=53 in the 18
men). Moreover, the latter tended to refer to visible gender-based violence such as sexual
assaults, femicides, and domestic violence more than to structural gender-based violence; it
was mainly the female interviewees who highlighted structural issues such as social and
economic gender inequality.
Although it is not possible to carry out statistical significance tests for this sample
considering its size, and therefore, results are only exploratory, the abovementioned is
nonetheless a remarkable finding that provides relative evidence to hypothesize that
structural gender-based violence and peace may be more prevalent in the feelings,
perceptions, and ideas of women than of men.
All these factors should be considered for their relevance within the agenda of a
dialogue process for peacebuilding in Ecatepec.
C. Socioeconomic issues
This table presents the most recurring categories under this topic.

Categories

Number of
coding
references

Unemployment
Recovery, improvement, reintegration, and hope
Effects of the pandemic, COVID-19-related issues
Lack of resources to meet basic needs
Free time, leisure, and idleness, which can cause

71
62
53
41
30

Proportion of
interviewees
mentioning it at
least once
67.7%
58.1%
61.3%
41.9%
32.3%
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problems
Migration of outsiders to Ecatepec
Overpopulation
Low-paying jobs with long work hours
Informal work
Lack of social security
Table 4.0: Socioeconomic issues

27
27
24
23
19

51.6%
45.2%
35.5%
41.9%
29.0%

Although socioeconomic issues were not among the top 10 most mentioned ones during the
interviews, we considered it important to find out the extent to which these were among the
interviewees’ concerns. A detailed review revealed the following:
1. The interviewees were considerably anxious about unemployment (f=71; 68%
mentioned it at least once), a concern that adds to the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic (f=53; 61% mentioned it at least once), and more than 40% spoke at least
once about insufficient resources to meet basic needs. This is a typical mention
about this topic:
I believe that the reason is the lack of good income jobs. Here in Jardines de
Morelos (a neighborhood), I'm going to tell you about my neighborhood, the biggest
source of work was public transportation. As a result of the “Mexi-Bus” being
launched, many, many people were taken off their jobs. There were people who
committed suicide because they lost their jobs. That is one factor. (Retail dealer)
2. More than half of the interviewees (58%) mentioned the possibilities for recovery,
the hope they maintain that the situation will improve, showing impressive
resilience, at least in spirit. This is just an example:
Right now, when we are in the land project, that truck that is out there, was horrible,
horrible. It was only a “shell”, and my pastor told me, “How about it my friend? We
are going to fix it, and we are going to buy that land for the elderly…” And well,
when he said that, I told him "That’s great”. But I didn't believe it, do you
understand me? It was just a comment. But suddenly, Monday came and Carlos
said “Bring the crane, let's put the truck here and rebuild it” ... and, well, we started
... boom ... boom ... boom ... and 5 years, and ta ... ta ... ta, and well there is the
truck. I think this was just impossible; he had received that land from a donation,
but he didn't want it. He said that with the fruit of that truck, we were going to pay
for that land and that all the people had to help with 1,000 pesos each ticket to help
the elderly. That is his dream. And I said “Yes, pal, God willing yes!” and the
tickets were sold out. (Driver, former convict)
3. More than a third of participants highlighted the risks posed by unemployment, that
is, the problems idleness can cause—for example, those related to insecurity.
Consider this interview excerpt:
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By not being busy, then they go for the “easy life”. They go to steal things from
people next door. It is natural, they need money. They have to have a job. I say that
a young man who doesn't have a job has to look for himself. What is the first thing
they do? He is approached by a criminal, and they get excited, but I say that the
main thing for youngsters is work and education, that there be open education for
everyone. They commonly don’t have opportunities to study, for the same reason.
Just earning a small salary; nowadays salaries can’t even pay for transportation
anymore. (Blacksmith)
D. Sociopolitical issues
This table presents the most recurring categories under this topic.

Categories
Citizen or community participation or organization
Sense of community
Stigma, prejudice, and discrimination
Family involvement and values, and parental care
Lack of participation; apathy/avoidance/habituation
Religious groups
Teachers or professors
Protestors and social protests
Lack of attention to youths and children by parents
Activists
Table 5.0: Sociopolitical issues

Number of
coding
references
231
114
83
78
74
71
69
66
58
54

Proportion of
interviewees
mentioning it at
least once
96.8%
71.0%
54.8%
61.3%
74.2%
45.2%
87.1%
67.7%
54.8%
48.4%

In addition to the issues already explained above, such as citizen or community
participation or organization, it should be noted that, for some interviewees (61%), this
topic is specifically linked to the participation of families in terms of values and education
provided by parents. It is important to consider that our sample included several
participants who tended to talk about religious subjects and groups (f=71; 45.2% mentioned
them at least once). In general, 54% of interviewees believe that the lack of attention by
parents to youth and childhood are contributing factors to the social decomposition. This is
an example:
I believe in values, I believe a lot in that, if you as a leader of a group, in this case,
of a family, seek to promote or strengthen those values, but you really do it, you can
help make good people. But if you teach young children to lie, or you don't pay
much attention because maybe they told you a little lie, or because they didn't do
their homework well, or because I don't know, they have no respect for others, then
we are lost. Because then, how am I going to tell him later that it is wrong to lie
when I always let him lie and never say anything to him when he lies? How am I
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going to say something to him when he doesn’t do his job if, as a child, I did his
homework for him, or allowed him not to finish it? How am I going to tell her that
she should be respectful or even that they should respect her if she didn't experience
respect at home? That is why the issue of values for me is basic in this matter.
(Communicologist)

In any case, what stands out in this topical area is the role of activism, citizen participation
and the sense of community that is generated through that participation, in contrast to the
participants’ distrust of those institutions that have abandoned them; a necessity to get
together and organize themselves (either as families, as organizations, as neighborhood
groups, as groups of teachers, or as protesters), in order to deal with their unmet most basic
needs. This is typical mention about this theme:
There are many ways… I, for some time, belonged to a group of runners. We were
all from here, from my community. Then, there were people who came and asked
for support. We provided it. We'd take him for a run, get them distracted and all
that. Perhaps it can’t be said that we solved many of their issues, but we have gained
one or two souls. And just with the fact that they stop drinking or smoking, for us it
is a big change. (Retail dealer)
Despite this, there were also several mentions regarding a perceived apathy in some sectors
of their community. Certain participants expressed their frustration as a result of the
appreciation that a part of the citizenry does participate and is active, while there are people
who are not. This theme received 74 mentions, and 74% of the sample expressed in those
terms at least once. An additional issue has to do with the absence of skills for dialogue
perceived by 61% of our sample. An example:
Now, I understand the people who does it (block someone on social networks)
because they have felt hurt and say, “I don't want you anymore in my life”. I
understand that. But you do get me when there is a broad public discourse that says
"man, you said that and you are canceled, and you’re canceled forever" ... and
people already live with fear of cancellation, and that is generating a kind of, I don't
know ... I think there are things that we would have to think a lot about and that
goes beyond our political positions. These are just devices that we put to work
permanently regardless of whether you are pro rights or anti-rights, right? But we
are using these same devices to annul ourselves and that is shit. (Activist)
E. Issues related to authorities or the government
This table presents the most recurring categories under this topic.

Categories

Number of coding
references

Proportion of
interviewees
mentioning it at
least once

Ineffectiveness of authorities

214

100%
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Corruption
Dissatisfaction with authorities
Lack of attention or support from
authorities
Local governance
Abuse of power
Collusion between authorities, criminals,
and delinquents
Impunity
Poorly trained personnel

160
118
90

87.1%
77.4%
74.2%

84
66
61

77.4%
58.1%
64.5%

61
34

58.1%
45.2%

Lack or failure of crime prevention
strategies

31

54.8%

Table 6.0: Issues related to authorities or the government
This topic reflects the enormous dissatisfaction and frustration of the interviewees with past
governments and authorities, especially local ones. As mentioned, several of these themes
are among the highest recurrences in our interviews. But in addition to this, it is worth
noting that more than seven out of every ten participants feel that there is a lack of attention
or support from the authorities; 58% spoke about the existing abuse of power; 64%
perceive that there is collusion between the authorities and crime (a recurring node in
different investigations that we have carried out in other parts of the country, vg.
Meschoulam, 2019) and six out of ten are concerned about impunity.
In addition to anger and negative feelings towards the authorities, 55% of the
interviewees considered that there are no effective strategies to prevent crime and almost
half of them thought that the authorities are poorly prepared.
Interestingly, there were 84 mentions among 77% of participants about the need to
implement local government management strategies. This node is highly consistent with
other factors that we pointed out previously and exhibits the need to develop public policies
and local actions, energizing actors from the municipality in order to address the major
concerns that emerge in the interviews. Any process of dialogue for peace will need to take
that into consideration. Here are some examples taken from the interviews:
The truth is that I have read about Ecatepec being the petty cash of the political
campaigns in the State of Mexico. What do I mean by this? On many occasions, the
State of Mexico governors use the resources of Ecatepec—because they receive a
lot of money, although not enough, I clarify, but a good sum, here from the
municipality of Ecatepec—and they take this money to carry out their political
campaigns. Obviously illegally, but they do it, and also, because a large amount of
the budget that comes to Ecatepec is used precisely to carry out proselytizing acts,
that is, acts that are convenient for them and instead of spending that money, I don't
know, on building hospitals, or building schools, I don't know, anything else,
because they use it for, well, to buy, I don't know, anything they wish… food
supplies for example. (Student)
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When there is a problem, and you call for a police patrol, it never comes. (Nurse)
Because let’s say that the president sets a “model policeman”, but policemen will
always become corrupted here. If they happen to catch a drug dealer, the drug
dealers will offer him 50,000 pesos (2,500 USD) when, to earn that, he has to work
several fortnights. (Municipal Police Officer)
Well, very simple, the cartels put money into the campaigns of politicians, and that
implies favors, that is the truth. So, who rules? Organized crime. They decide who
runs for municipal president, they decide who runs for governor, and even at some
point they decided who was going to be the country’s president. (Activist)
F. Major deprivations and problems in daily life
This table presents the most recurring categories under this topic.

Categories
Lack of opportunities
Shortage of water
Need for cultural and recreational activities
(music, sports, workshops, forums, discussions,
etc.)
Lack of education
Shortage of various public services (other than
water)
Necessity of or difficulties in building the social
fabric
Lack of public investment
Social programs to create politico-electoral
preferences
Lack of lighting
Lack of mobility services

88
87
81

Proportion of
interviewees
mentioning it at
least once
74.2%
80.7%
74.2%

76
74

77.4%
80.7%

58

41.9%

37
32

48.4%
48.4%

25
22

61.3%
35.5%

Number of
coding
references

Table 7.0: Major deprivations and problems in daily life
The deprivations in basic services were a recurring issue. Altogether, this research shows
208 occasions in which the 31 people interviewed indicated that they were concerned about
lack of basic needs. Specifically, 81% of interviewees highlighted the shortage of water; a
similar number of participants spoke about the absence of other public services; more than
60% mentioned the lack of electricity and 35% reported being concerned about the lack of
mobility services.

Material Deprivation and Human Wealth

63

Beyond these basic themes, it is noteworthy that 74% of participants spoke about
the lack and need to have cultural or recreational activities, which includes sports activities,
workshops, forums or conversations; 42% told us about the difficulties to rebuild the social
fabric and 48% highlighted the absence of investment in their community.
These factors are also consistent with other studies we have conducted (please refer
to the conceptual background) and do matter. Perhaps, public policy designers or analysts
might think that, faced with such a level of deprivation and lack of services such as water or
electricity, citizens may solely be preoccupied about those basic needs. These results
highlight, however, other types of necessities such as culture, recreation and above all, the
wish for an environment in which they can interact and have a solid social fabric. When
these factors are scarce, this is added to other types of deficiencies, which, in an atmosphere
of high insecurity, represents a perfect storm for people's lives and dignity. Here are
examples of these mentions:
So, it's a lot of things, right? I say, “How the hell are we going to talk about
peacebuilding? How the hell are we going to be able to reconcile regarding any
problem, if we don't have the most basic needs solved?" (Community Center
Collaborator)
Here, we get water every 28 days, so I'll make it easy for you: Tell me if our
community isn’t hurt. Yesterday, we had no electricity for almost two hours, and we
were online. Transportation is very expensive. To go to “Indios Verdes” it costs 23
pesos. It is very expensive, multiply 23 pesos by 2, plus the subway ticket because
the bus only gets you to “Indios Verdes”, and back, and since it is 2 to 3 hours, then
you need to get a sweet at least, because your stomach requires it. Expensive
transportation, insufficient electricity, water every 28 days…The streets are crap; if
you have a car, you almost have to lift it with your hand because there are holes and
bumps; our community is very hurt. (Mechanical engineer)
Spend time together ... I do believe that more such efforts can be generated, if there
were more Christian meetings ... well, not necessarily Christian, but people who
joined and spent time together, it would be very good. (Driver, former convict)
Cultural or sports activities, basketball, volleyball, guitar competitions, dancing,
singing, theater. People lack culture, here in the State of Mexico, that is missing so
much. If you go to Mexico City there are many places with sports and cultural
activities. Yes, I know that we are also well behind in sports and culture there, but at
least there is more than here. Yes, in the city there are more ways to get some
culture, but here, there aren’t, there is a lack of movement, push, call. (Retail dealer)
Discussion
The above results highlight several aspects simultaneously:
First, there is high awareness among the interviewees of the unresolved structural
factors underlying the absence of peace, such as deprivations, weakness of institutions,
corruption, negligence by political actors, poverty, and inequality, therefore, thinking about
peacebuilding processes that do not consider these factors is insufficient and ineffective.
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Second, the interviewees have come to these conclusions based on their own
experiences, and those of people close to them, and daily conversations. Their distrust of
institutions causes, at least partly, that for validating a piece of information or statistics, or
to build an opinion about their environment and the country in general, they have to rely on
their personal experiences or those of people whom they trust.
This shows the relevance of local policy and, for any peace dialogue, of the need to
work locally, include local actors, and formulate focused strategies.
Third, the importance of citizen participation and organization in this municipality
to cover some of the gaps and needs not covered by the social and political system is
evident. This also reveals the need to include a significant number of neighborhood and
community actors as part of the peacebuilding exercises.
Fourth, the most recurring issues during the interviews highlight the enormous area
of opportunity that exists for a dialogue process. For example, it is urgent to rebuild the
bridges between those who govern—highly perceived as corrupt, inefficient or poorly
trained authorities, who have neglected the municipality—and the battered citizens forced
to organize themselves and solve their problems on their own. However, at the same time,
the dialogue must support mutual listening, allowing those who govern to express their
views, as well as establish channels between the various actors who make up the complex
social fabric of the municipality.
Fifth, it is necessary to work for not only the material well-being but also the
emotional well-being of the residents. This includes thinking about how to mitigate the
psychosocial effects of the fear of violence and including sports, art, culture, and recreation
in the agenda—these are not less important, for they contribute to rebuilding the social
fabric and human relationships.
Finally, this series of issues is not relevant only to a specific municipality, or to
Mexico as a country. Distrust of institutions, corruption, and citizens distancing themselves
from governments or traditional media, are global issues deserving attention (Edelman
Trust Barometer, 2021). This study provides some indicators to formulate hypotheses that
could be confirmed by research in other parts of the world—for example, the role played by
people’s own experiences and by local policies in the social construction of perceptions of
the possibilities for well-being and peace.
Recommendations
Based on the collected evidence and obtained results, our recommendations for a possible
peace dialogue in the studied municipality are as follows:
1. Actors: We identified a wide range of actors who could participate in the dialogue.
The highlights of the list of actors concern our own results. We point out two: a) the
perceived sense of neglect by and frustration with the authorities, and b) the role of
community participation and organization at a local level. This naturally leads to the
need to be inclusive in the selection of potential participants for the exercise and to
ensure the presence of all governments (local, state, and federal), legislative and
judicial powers, as well as law enforcement agencies, organizations, collectives,
women, and—most importantly—community members.
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2. The process: Our study reports a perceived lack of skills for dialogue among actors.
This, along with the perception of neglect and distancing, forces us to be emphatic
about the process—it is essential to train the different actors in dialogue strategies,
elastic collaboration, and conflict resolution.
3. Issues: Given the results, we propose a thematic balance between two major
findings, (1) structural peace and (2) everyday experience (the value of the local).
Dialogue workshops could ask questions such as the following: What is needed to
address the socioeconomic and structural factors that build peace from the root, and
at the same time, how to translate this into a positive impact on people’s everyday
experiences? The aim should be to ensure that the different participating actors can
collaborate to achieve this balance, at least in the discussion, and spark ideas to
make collaboration that goes beyond the exercise a reality.
4. Emphasize what can be achieved. Due to the endemic nature of many of the issues
highlighted in the interviews, it is important to ensure that a possible dialogue in
Ecatepec does not cause frustration among its participants but rather concentrates on
discussing and developing viable ideas, no matter how small they seem.
5. For this, we propose not only training the potential participants in dialogue
strategies, but also including some activities in workshops and exercises that show
the relevance of structural peace (for example, the fight against inequality and
corruption) and of local strategies for peacebuilding, such as strengthening the
social fabric, neighborhood or proximity policing, sports, art, and cultural activities,
or local tools for peace education.
6. Fear and peacebuilding: This issue—one of our major findings, and more prevalent
among the female interviewees—is strongly related to points 4 and 5 above.
Unfortunately, it is often neglected, and the negative impact of collective fear on
dialogue and peace processes is ignored. We propose that at least one or two
sessions on what is known as “inner peace,” stress reduction, or other strategies
implemented by specialized personnel be included in the workshop. This section of
the workshop would have two objectives: (a) to have a positive impact on the
participants, which contributes to a better outcome of the exercise (Meschoulam &
Calderon, 2019), and (b) to demonstrate the power of these simple strategies, thus
opening up the possibility of expanding them to other parts of the municipality.
These tactics, coupled with other stress reduction strategies, including sports and
art, can help facilitate dialogue.
7. Gender perspective: Based on the findings, we propose that equal participation of
women and men be ensured, and some of the abovementioned gender issues be
included in the discussions/exercises. For example, not only mentioning homicides,
but including femicides, and not only discussing criminal violence, but including
domestic and gender-based violence in the speech; thus, not only talking about
peacebuilding, but include peacebuilding with a gender perspective.
Conclusions
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One of our interviewees mentioned that Ecatepec residents were not aspiring for the
“American dream,” but only for the “Mexico City dream”. In Mexico City, despite all its
problems notwithstanding, people can, at least, walk down the street, have a coffee, go to a
movie, or look at trees; these simple pleasures are absent in Ecatepec. How can
peacebuilding be addressed among the residents of a municipality whose main concerns are
centered on the most basic aspects of daily life: personal and material safety, access to
essential services, or mobility to go to work?
The scope of the qualitative research presented in this paper does not extend to a
discussion on all the causes or factors responsible for the municipality’s current situation; it
isn’t even possible to transfer the results to its entire population. However, it provides some
important clues, and these could lead to ideas, perhaps, for not only the municipality but
also other parts of Mexico and the world: on the one hand, the need to have an impact
locally and from the root, and on the other, the apparent contrast between the numerous
material deprivations and the extensive assets that exist thanks to the human wealth of
citizens who have had to learn to adapt and solve their complex daily problems, and, as
indicated in this study, need to dialogue, and need to sustain hope for a better future. It is
from this point—human wealth—that a possible peacebuilding exercise must start, whether
here or in any other part of the world.
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Abstract
Informed by the disciplines of Leadership Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies, the author
offers an understanding of peace leadership as being an interconnected affair of the head
(consciousness-raising), heart (feeling the need for transformative change), hands (to be moved
to purposive action) and the holy (offering all the sacred gift of treating persons as persons).
Building on an earlier publication in this Journal, this article reconstructs conditions for peace at
intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural levels. It also offers a deutero learning framework and
model for coordinating the efforts for the sake of peace through an understanding of leadership
as being a fourfold affair of the head, heart, hands and holy. The author reasons that a genuine
community is constructed when people come together not in the name of religion, but when they
come together bringing honesty, respect, and kindness to support an awakening of a sacred gift,
namely the gift of treating persons like persons, with dignity and respect.

It is proper to every gathering that gatherers assemble to coordinate their efforts to
sheltering; only when they have gathered with that end in view do they begin to gather.
(Heidegger, 1977, n.p.).
Introduction
This article builds on Part 1 (Amaladas, 2020 where, I raised three questions. First, for the sake
of reconciliation and healing, what conditions must be present for all to act from the perspective
that ‘we are all in this together?’ Second, what conditions prevent us from seeing and acting
from this perspective? Third, what learning process can we construct to make it possible for self
and others to act from the perspective of ‘we are all in this together?’
In response to questions one and two, I offered seven conditions for all who dwell in this
shared place called Canada and who gather in the name of Peace. These include:
 Situating ourselves within the ecology of caring and trusting
 Subordinating or surrendering ourselves to being governed by the principles of sparing,
preserving, and safeguarding each other from harm or danger.
 Attending to and embracing the non-negotiable principles of social justice and treating
persons as persons.
 Shifting away from either-or dualistic thinking that has come to dominate our modern
era.
 Intentionally orienting to the possibility of increasing choices and to the possibility of
more than two possibilities.
 Aspiring for what we want as a collective by intentionally turning toward rather than
away from practices that they want to see avoided in their public sphere.
 Being willing to “let go” of hurt, pain, guilt, and a spirit of revenge and ”let come” the
courage to dream the impossible dream as a real possibility.
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The inability, or the refusal to do so, as I argued in my earlier article, is that we all lose and we
will all die from the cold within.
In this article, I reframe the third question in this way: What conditions must be present
and what learning processes can we construct to make it possible for self and others to act from
the perspective of ‘we are all in this together?’ Following O’Dea (2012), who suggests, that
those who lead for peace, or peace ambassadors, as he calls them, are being challenged to
transform “both inner blockages to peace and those blockages in external relations, culture, and
systems that prevent peace in the world” (2011, p. ii), then, this article is organized as follows.
From the perspective of conditions, I will first address the inner blockages to peace
(intrapersonal quest). Second, I will speak to blockages in external relations (interpersonal
quest), and third to culture and systems preventing peace in our world. From the perspective of a
learning process, I will offer a deutero-learning model and framework for radical and
transformative change. In as much as the etymology of radical means root or forming the root, I
will propose that we orient to the interconnectedness and interrelationship among four Hs (the
fourfold) as forming the roots of peace leadership. This fourfold include orienting to the affairs
of peace leadership from the perspectives of the head, heart, hands, and holy.
Conceptual Framework
My formulation of the fourfold is itself informed by Burns (1978) who is considered by some as
the ‘father of leadership studies’ (Barbour, 2006). Burns notes that the “essential task” of
leadership is “consciousness-raising” and that the “fundamental act is to induce people to be
aware or conscious of that they feel- to feel their true needs so strongly, to define their values so
meaningfully, that they can be moved to purposeful action” (pp. 43-44). And what is the
purposeful action that he references? This purposeful action is reflected in his “practical advice”
which he offers in the last page of his volume: “to treat...all persons like persons” (p. 462). The
fourfold then, includes consciousness-raising (affair of the head), feeling their true needs and
meaningfully defining their values (affair of the heart), that they can be moved to purposeful
action (affair of the hands). The fourth H is connected to Burns’ (1978) question “leadership to
what?” (p. 457). The ultimate purpose, namely a purpose that is desired as an end in itself, is to
treat persons like persons. I would suggest that this is the unnegotiable and sacred purpose for
peace leadership. Treating persons as persons is the sacred gift that we give to each other as
human beings. And in so doing we care and spare each other from harm and danger. It is in this
vein, that Kornfield (1993), a psychologist, notes that a
...community is created not when people come together not in the name of religion, but
when they come together bringing honesty, respect, and kindness to support an
awakening of the sacred. True community arises when we can speak in accord with truth
and compassion. This sense of spiritual community is a wondrous part of what heals and
transforms us on our path. (p. 24)
Allow me then, to continue on the path for truth, compassion, healing and reconciliation.

Facilitating Peace Leadership

71

Section 1: Leading For Peace - An Intrapersonal Quest
From the perspective of the theory and praxis of reconciliation and re-building trust in our
troubled world or violence, Confucius, the Latin name for Kong Fuzi, who lived around 500
B.C.E., already laid a path about what it means to put the world in order.
To put the world in order, we must put the nation in order,
To put the nation in order, we must put the family in order,
To put the family in order, we must first cultivate our personal life,
And to cultivate our personal life, we must first set our hearts straight. (as cited in Estes,
2017, p. 10)
The implications of Kong Fuzi’s thinking is that if we, as individual human beings, do not first
set our own hearts straight, if there is no peace within one’s own heart, then there will be
disorder in the family, nation, and world. At an intrapersonal level, to set one’s own heart
straight is to think and act in ways that safeguards one’s own self from danger and harm. The
complexity of the human process of leading for peace at an intrapersonal level is captured well in
a story of an old Cherokee who is teaching his grandson about life.
“A fight is going on inside me,” he said to the boy.
“It’s a terrible fight and it is between two wolves. One is evil – he is anger, envy, sorrow,
regret, greed, arrogance, self-pity, guilt, resentment, inferiority, lies, false pride,
superiority, and ego,” He continued,
“The other is good – he is joy, peace, love, hope, serenity, humility, kindness,
benevolence, empathy, generosity, truth, compassion, and faith. The same fight is going
on inside you – and inside every other person too.”
The grandson thought about it for a minute and then asked his grandfather, “Which wolf
will win?”
The old Cherokee replied, “The one you feed.”
The old Cherokee appears to be teaching his grandson (and anyone else who cares to listen)
about the need to raise our consciousness and to be aware of what we are feeding ourselves. The
complexity of human processes, as this Indigenous elder teaches, resides in what is within the
heart of each human being – good and evil. And it is not as simple as ripping evil out for the sake
of the good. To rip anyone part apart is to rip one’s own heart out. It will in effect kill any human
being.
Within the context of the old Cherokee’s story, the internal blockage appears to reside not
only in this “terrible fight that is going on between two wolves” inside every person, but also the
lack of the head’s awareness as to which wolf we are feeding. This blockage stands in the way of
embracing the call that “we are all in this together.” This blockage can only result in win-lose,
lose-win, and lose-lose propositions. But is it simply a matter of being aware of which wolf we
are feeding?
Cultural Violence: Survivor Stories
Let us turn our attention to the sad and dehumanizing stories shared by some residential school
survivors in Canada.. As reflected in the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation
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Commission of Canada (TRCC), the residential schools were in existence for well over 100
years. It was “created for the purpose of separating Aboriginal children from their families, in
order to minimize and weaken family ties and cultural linkages, and to indoctrinate children into
a new culture” (2015, p. v). At that time, it was the “culture of the legally dominant EuroChristian Canadian society, led by Canada’s first prime minister, Sir. John A. Macdonald” (2015,
p. v). The TRCC heard from more the 6,000 survivors of this school system. Some of their
stories included:





They said, the only good Indian is a dead Indian...Even the nuns told me that.
One rule was that children were not allowed to go to the bathroom after 10:00 pm.
Lafford said he became a bed-wetter as a result and was forced to carry his soiled
bedclothes on his head through the cafeteria at breakfast every time it happened.
Georgina Doucette of Eskasoni said leaving the residential school was also difficult.
Coming back into my community, I felt as if I didn’t belong. ... We didn’t belong in the
White world, and we didn’t belong in our community.

Georgina Doucette continued her story by narrating that it took her a long time to cope with her
experiences, and she turned to liquor at a young age.
I passed on that legacy to my children. When I sobered up 24 years ago, I looked at them.
And I kept apologizing. I feel deep down, this is the road I set for my children, with
alcoholism. And their children drink and do drugs. I feel very guilty. It’s hard to shake
that guilt when you’ve carried it for so long.
These stories of residential school survivors may suggest that the burden and trauma or
resentment, anger, sorrow, healing, forgiveness, and reconciling self with one’s own experiences,
belongs only to “them” – to the survivors, alone. If so, then it appears as if the process of
reconciliation can only occur between the survivors and their own communities. This way of
thinking would only affirm that “we are not all in this together,” and that it is a part of ‘their’
history, and not ‘ours.’ It will in effect be a confirmation that reconciliation is an “Aboriginal
problem,” and not “a Canadian problem.”
The language of survivors suggests that there were/are perpetrators. Within the context of
the TRCC, the perpetrators were (are?) the “culture of the legally dominant Euro-Christian
Canadian society, led by Canada’s first prime minister, Sir. John A. Macdonald.” It is, in
Galtung’s (1990) language a product of “cultural violence.” But how can those who were not a
part of Macdonald’s time take responsibility for that which they did not perpetrate? Are they to
simply feel guilty for all that went before?
It is here that we need to shift our focus to O’Dea’s “blockages in external relations,
culture, and systems that prevent peace in the world” (2011, p. ii). Not taking collective
responsibility, for O’Dea (2012) and Galtung (1998) might result in silently perpetuating
intergenerational violence. Let us imagine peace travelers meeting O’Dea or Galtung on the road
and asked them for directions: “Which way to peace?” We could imagine them as saying: “Turn
right at Concord-ia Ave., till your reach Reconciliation Street. Turn left, and if you continue with
courage and perseverance along that road, you will not only see peace ahead of you, but you will
also experience peace along the way. But be careful of road signs that read, ‘Ours is the right
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way.’” Allow me now to turn our attention to thinking and talking about peace leadership from
an interpersonal level and then move to talking about blockages to peace at a cultural level.
Leading For Peace: An Interpersonal Quest
Galtung affirmed that peace leadership does not reside with any one person. He used the
metaphor/simile of a marriage to capture the nature of the relationship of peace and/or trust
building. He noted:
.
..peace is not a property of one party alone, but a property of the relation between
parties... like a marriage, it is not the sum of the capabilities of the parties. Which is why
we can have lovely people related in a less-than-lovely marriage. And vice versa. (2014,
n.p.)
Galtung could be heard as saying that lovely Indigenous and Non-Indigenous people may be in a
dysfunctional (less-than-lovely) relationship. For lovely people who may be in a dysfunctional
relationship, if they are committed to saving their relationship, is it reasonable for only one of the
parties to go for ‘relationship counselling,’?’ In relationship counselling, we hope that the
relationship counsellor is able to facilitate a process where individual persons are able to see and
take responsibility for the current state of their relationship, rather than creating conditions for
blaming the other. We hope that relationship-counsellors come into the counselling relationship
not with pre-determined solutions but rather, by looking for ways to facilitate a process where all
parties are able to re-build and re-affirm their trust and love for each other. Building on
Galtung’s (2014) metaphor that peace is like a marriage, the relationship counsellor can be
viewed as enabling a process where all parties can pursue both negative peace (reducing or
eliminating negative relations) and positive peace (building ever more harmonious relations).
We must, however, admit that what is different about Indigenous and Non-Indigenous
people is that they did not choose to marry each other. Perhaps it would be appropriate to define
that relationship as a shot-gun marriage. However, from the perspective of relationship building,
we imagine Galtung as inviting us to consider the possibility of thinking about the broken
relationship between Canadian Indigenous and Non-Indigenous peoples within the context of
making a choice to build a life together (we are all in this together). To not do so would only
mean that we remain indifferent to each other, and not care about the other. Indifference is a
relationship other that being a friend or an enemy. Unlike Galtung (2014.), we would suggest
that indifference is not a question of being in a ‘non-relation’ but rather to be in a relationship of
the strangeness. We would suggest that the indifference of being a stranger not only kills
individuals from their ‘cold within,’ but it also snuffs out the ‘fire’ that can keep friendly care
alive. To engage with the other in a friendly conversation, is to offer friends, enemies, and
strangers a real possibility to hear the need for care as the purposeful aim of conversation (Blum
and McHugh, 1979). It is in this caring-conversation that we are able to build trust.
ATTUNE
Gottman, a psychologist, clinician, and ‘relationship expert,’ acknowledges that not only is trust
built slowly and over time through processes of reconciliation, but that at the basis of trust is
really the idea of attunement. His experience with couples struggling in their relationship showed
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that the more highly skilled partners became in achieving attunement “the more resilient their
friendship and the more solid and promising their future” (2011, p. 24). Brittle (2015) a certified
Gottman therapist, asked his readers to consider ATTUNE as an acronym: Awareness, Turning
Toward, Tolerance, Understanding, Non-defensive responding, and Empathy. Gottman suggests
that we can build attunement, or become more attuned with each other, through ‘the art of
intimate conversation.’ While we have already started down the road of awareness, allow us to
stay a little longer on this notion of ‘turning toward.’
Within the context of protests, perhaps we need to turn toward the other side of trust,
namely betrayal that leads to distrust. In the same way that peace/conflict, negative/positive
peace, connection/ separation are concepts that belong together, ecosystemic thinking would also
suggest that trust/betrayal/distrust are concepts that belong together. Betrayal exists in any
relationships. Infidelity in a married relationship, for example, may result in a decision like: “I’m
out.” We could hear a person say: “If my partner cheats, I’m out.” The challenge in turning
toward betrayal with a zero-tolerance policy, is that it kills any effort to re-build trust. Whereas
the threat of infidelity (betrayal) is that it can kill a marriage-relationship, the promise of turning
toward that very betrayal with tolerance, understanding, non-defensive reasoning, and empathy is
the possibility of creating higher attunement and a more intimate attachment. In saying this, we
do not intend to diminish the pain that betrayals like infidelity introduces into a relationship. We
must acknowledge that separation and divorce can be, and often is, in this situation, a real
possibility.
In Canada, however, and within the context past and present practices among Indigenous
and Non-Indigenous persons, and within the context of “we are all in this together,” divorce
would only affirm that the problem is not a Canadian problem. Divorce would result in the
break-up of Canada as we know it today. It would result in the separation of the Canadian
population. Divorce would force us back into the “us” vs “them” relationship from the
perspective of “irreconcilable differences.” It would mean the re-drawing of ‘borders’ to reflect
one’s own needs and interests. It would fundamentally mean that “we are not all in this
together.” If divorce is not an option, then as Canadians, we are all called to make the difficult
decision to turn towards the pain of betrayal and distrust, for the sake of heeding the call to care.
Perhaps this is how we can understand what Burns (2006), meant by transforming
leadership. Burns, for example distinguishes between the verbs ‘change’ and ‘transform’ in the
following way.
To change is to substitute one thing for another, to give and take, to exchange places, to
pass from one place to another. These are the kinds of changes that I attribute to
transactional leadership. But to transform something cuts much more profoundly. It is to
cause a metamorphosis in form or structure, a change in the very condition or nature of a
thing, a change into another substance, a radical change in outward form or inner
character...It is change of this breadth and depth that is fostered by transforming
leadership. (Burns, 2003, p. 24)
To intentionally engage in the transforming process of re-building trust would necessitate all
Canadians to turn toward the pain of the past and to the irreversibility of the consequences of
past actions, in ways that enable a radical change in outward form and inner character. Following
Galtung (1998) it is a transformative experience that needs to occur at the ‘root’ of the conflict
relationship between and among all Canadians, Indigenous and Non-indigenous, survivors and
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perpetrators. Turning toward this pain may be like looking into a horror cabinet, but like trauma,
they reflect a reality that needs to be known and understood. Why? Because we care. And it
cannot simply be a matter of transactional caring.
While researchers (Milke, 2013) at the Fraser Institute acknowledge that Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development Canada’s spending on Canada’s Aboriginal peoples rose
from $79 million annually in 1946/47 to almost $7.9 billion in 2011/2012, radical transformative
change cannot remain exclusively at the level of transactions, monetary or otherwise. While we
need also to move towards “‘a higher order of change’ constituting alterations in ‘attitudes,
beliefs, values, and needs’” (Burns, 2003, p. 24), it is unfortunate that monetary settlements are
often viewed as “case closed,” rather than reopening conversations at a deeper level and for the
sake of a higher-order-consciousness of what it means to be together as a Canadian community.
Transforming the Attitude of Superiority
One fundamental attitude that prevents “a higher order change,” is made nakedly visible by
Galton (1869) in his published volume Hereditary Genius. Some like Zaccaro (2007) noted that
the trait-based perspective of leadership dates back to Galton’s volume and that it has informed
and misinformed popular notions of leadership (p. 6). Zaccaro (2007) succinctly captured
Galton’s two basic points. First, what remains as a persistent view of leadership in popular
literature is that “leadership (is) a unique property of extraordinary individuals whose decisions
are capable of sometimes radically changing the stream of history” (p. 6). Second, Galton
“grounds the unique attributes of such individuals in their inherited or genetic makeup” (Zaccaro,
2007, p. 6). As a result, personal characteristics defining an effective leader, were assumed to be
naturally endowed and passed on from generation to generation. We would, however, suggest
that what is at stake is more complex than the “practical implication” that the immutable quality
of leadership is “not amenable to developmental interventions” Zaccaro, 2007, p. 6). However, in
reading Galton (1869), we encounter a darker picture.
Galton (1869) considered his book title to be “more expressive and just…than
Hereditary Ability” because ability includes the effects of education and genius does not (pp. viii
– ix). While Galton (1869) specifically stated that he did not intend to use the word ‘genius’ in
any technical sense, but “merely” to express “an ability that was exceptionally high and at the
same time inborn” (Galton, 1869, p. viii), he does not stop there. He continues with a rather
troubling attitude and belief. He claimed that
...there is nothing either in the history of domestic animals or in that of evolution to make
us doubt that a race of sane men may be formed who shall be as much superior mentally
and morally to the modern European, as the modern European is to the lowest of the
Negro races. (p. x)
There is absolutely no doubt in Galton’s mind of the mental and moral superiority of the modern
European. How we have come to understand ‘ethnocentrism,’ namely as a perception that one’s
own culture is better than the culture of others (Gudykunst & Kim, 1977) pales in comparison to
Galton’s (1869) formulation of the formation of the superiority of a race of the sane modern
European. Is his pseudo-biological-scientific formulation of the superiority of the modern
European not a mark of arrogance? But then again, the voice of ecosystemic thinking would
suggest that the mind (head) of superiority can only sustain itself by constructing and sustaining
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its belief that all other non-modern Europeans are inferior. Within the context of the history of
Canada’s residential schools, are not attitudes like this that fed the Europeans’ need to, at best,
educate and convert Indigenous children, and at worst, to kill the ‘barbaric Indian?”
It is not surprising then to hear Burns (2003) formulating leadership as an ‘aspect’ of
power and that transforming leadership is a cognitive process of engagement that raises both
leaders and followers “to higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns, 1978, p. 20). It is not
accidental to hear him say: “moral leadership concerns me the most” [Italics in original] (p. 4).
For him, moral leadership is “not mere preaching, or the uttering of pieties, or the insistence on
social conformity” (p. 4). Instead, it is a power relationship that transforms relationships in ways
that are grounded in the “Golden Rule,” rather than simply complying with rules like the “Ten
Commandments.” (p. 4). For him, the Golden Rule is “to treat persons as persons” [Italics
original] (p. 462) and not like pawns to be manipulated. It is also to boldly interpret the nation’s
conscience in ways that “lift a people out of their everyday selves,” by believing that “people can
be lifted into their better selves” (p. 462). This for Burns is the secret to transforming and moral
leadership.
Moral Imagination
We would also suggest that it is also this spirit of transforming leadership that moved Lederach,
to raise a “simple and endlessly complex question,” namely, “how do we transcend the cycles of
violence that bewitch our human condition while still living in them?” (2005, p. 5). For him,
“transcending violence is forged,” not forced, “by the capacity to generate, mobilize and build
the moral imagination” (Lederach, 2005, p. 5). The practice of solidarity (we are all in this
together), in other words, cannot simply be mandated. For Lederach, moral imagination is
mobilized when four disciplines are held together.
Simply stated, the moral imagination requires the capacity to imagine ourselves in a web
of relationship that includes our enemies; the ability to sustain a paradoxical curiosity that
embraces complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity; the fundamental belief in and
pursuit of the creative act; and the acceptance of the inherent risk of stepping into the
mystery of the unknown that lies beyond the far too familiar landscape of violence.
(Lederach, 2005, p. 5)
To imagine ourselves in a web of relationships, is a concept that is rooted ecosystemic thinking,
which speaks to the interconnectedness of all our relationships, including our enemies. If friends
are assumed to already be a part of this creative pursuit, we would extend Lederach’s
formulation of the capacity to imagine ourselves in a web of relationships, to also include
enemies (Discipline #1). Earlier in our paper, we addressed the problem of the polarity of
dualistic thinking within our all too familiar landscape of violence (Discipline #2). Allow us to
turn toward making explicit the creative act of forging and not forcing solidarity (Discipline #3).
For Kouzes and Posner (2017) for example, “you cannot force unity; instead, you forge it by
involving people in the process, making them feel that you are genuinely interested in their
perspectives, and that they can speak freely with you” (p. 65). At the same time, we step into this
process of forging unity by acknowledging the inherent risk in stepping into this territory
(Discipline #4). There is no guarantee that we will succeed.
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It is illuminating to hear Lederach speak of the mobilization of moral imagination as the
practice of holding four disciplines together (2005). The word “discipline” is derived from the
root Latin word discere, meaning “to learn.” Other derivatives of this word includes the noun
discipulus (pupil) and the verb to discern. At a cultural level, how can we go about processes of
learning that forges rather than forces solidarity/unity? At a cultural level, how can we engage in
learning that holds all four disciplines together?
Leading For Peace: A Cultural Quest
Galtung noted that the study and practice of leading for peace must also include “cultural
violence.” He defined cultural violence as “any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize
violence in its direct or structural form” (1990, p. 291). As we noted earlier, within the context of
Canada’s story, this includes turning toward, rather than away from, the experience of ‘cultural
genocide.’ In staying with Kong Fuzi’s framework of “putting the world in order,” cultural
violence can be interpreted as a disordered culture, and protests, like the Wet’suwet’en protests,
can also be experienced an indicator of a disordered culture, and actions to restore social justice.
Allow me to share a personal anecdote. When I shared Galton’s (1869) version of the
sane Modern European (as noted above), one consistent answer I received was, “well, that was
how it was back then.” Galtung would argue that part of the problem with a response like this is
that it can numb and dull our senses into seeing the reprehensibility of this form of thinking and
accepting the cultural exploitation and/or repressions that follow, as “normal and natural,” or
“into not seeing them at all” (1990, p. 295). Over time, he further opined, it may even translate
into cultural and structural violence “look(ing), even feel(ing), right – or at least not wrong” (p.
291).
Wet’suwet’en protests and the economic havoc that was created, can serve as a critical
event that triggers a need to turn toward and step into an all too familiar reality of conflict that
has yet to be resolved. To accept protests like this simply as our ‘new normal,’ would essentially
mean that (a) we are longer disturbed by these protests (indifference), or (b) we will only be
annoyed and angry if those protests negatively affect our economy and pocket-books (enemies).
On the one hand it is to remain indifferent (as strangers do) to what the protests are calling us to
consider or take into account. On the other hand, the anger that is felt because such protests do
negatively impact our pocket-books, can only lead to negative and disharmonious relationships
against those who elect to protest. To treat protests as our ‘new normal ‘would in effect offer us
two options, in the web our relationships: strangers and enemies. It precludes and stands in the
way of the appearance of a positive and harmonious relationship among friends, namely an
acknowledgment that “what is bad-good for one is bad-good for the Other” (Galtung 2014).
What is called for, instead, is the need to re-build trust. Trust is built when persons




Experience the trust-worthy-ness of each other,
Are confident that they each have the other’s back,
Speak and act in ways the bears testimony that they are all in this together.

To choose not to connect with the other when opportunities present themselves in the moment, is
an act of betrayal. It betrays the trust that “we are all in this together.” And Brené Brown, a
psychologist, quotes Charles Feltman, who, as she said had the “most beautiful definition of
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trust,” namely that “trust is choosing to make something important to you vulnerable to the
actions of someone else” (as cited in Brown, 2019).
To think of the act building of trust in the way that Feltman proposes, is to suggest that
learning to trust cannot simply be understood as learning the history of this or that population. It
is not a matter of instructions or techniques. And while public protests may be a cultural aspect
that triggers the need for rebuilding trust, processes of reconciliation cannot take place only by
remaining in the streets of protests. Where emotions are high, voices tend to become elevated,
and what we inherit is a continuum of reactions from shouting-matches, non-verbal stare-downs,
and intended peaceful marches that may end up in violence. Where then can processes of
reconciliation be appropriate? Allow me to offer one learning process as our way of answering
our third research question: What learning process can we construct to make it possible for self
and others to act from the perspective of: ‘we are all in this together?’
A Deutero-Learning Framework for Radical Change
Montville (1993) envisions reconciliation as occurring in specifically designed “workshop”
contexts where participants from both sides feel secure in the company of trained neutral third
parties who conduct various therapeutic exercises such as ‘walks through history.” Rinker and
Jonason (2016) describe these walks through history as a therapeutic process whereby victims of
harm are offered the opportunity to tell their stories. Fisher (1999) also supports approaches like
this through a process which is called Interactive Conflict Resolution because “full, successful
reconciliation between alienated groups cannot take place without an adequate degree of genuine
dialogue and conflict analysis of a mutual, interactive nature” (p. 82). We propose something
similar and yet a little different. We would propose inviting all Canadians in their respective
communities to facilitator-guided gatherings within the framework of deutero-learning.
Bateson and Bateson (1987) grouped three synonyms under the rubric of deuterolearning. First, “learning to learn” or metacognition. It implies that individuals have the capacity
to learn about the context in which their world are constructed, maintained, and changed. It also
implies that individuals can become aware of their own cognitive processes in maintaining their
worlds. Second, includes “learning to deal with and expect a given kind of context for adaptive
action” (Bateson & Bateson, 1987, p. 37). However, Visser (2007) warns us that while
individuals have the capacity to adapt to contexts of socialization, their adaptations may range
from healthy to pathological due to their socialized experiences. Finally, Bateson and Bateson
also collect deutero-learning under the synonym “character change due to experience” (1987, p.
13). This third synonym is aligned with Burns (2003) notion of higher order transformative and
radical change in outward form or inner character. Facilitating reconciliation within this deuterolearning framework would insist that each party focus on his or her own thinking, beliefs, and
behaviour and not on the thinking, beliefs, and behaviour of the other. What would the
application of this deutero-learning framework look like in our proposed facilitator-guided
community gatherings?
Facilitator-Guided Community Gatherings
In this grassroots process, we would recommend smaller community gatherings – anywhere from
20-24 persons from both Indigenous and Non-Indigenous populations.. We would also
recommend the presence of a facilitator, preferably one from each of the two communities who
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are skilled in “holding the context of dialogue” (Senge, 2006, p. 226). We would suggest that
“holding the context for dialogue,” would require facilitators to mindfully practice Naess’ (2002)
‘six ethical rules of verbal communication’ or what we would prefer to call “guiding principles,”
for the sake of bridging polarizations.
First, the facilitator would mindfully steer the gathering away from irrelevant talk.
Second, he/she creates conditions where any formulation aimed at representing the other’s
viewpoints must be such that the other considers the representation to be adequate. Third, she/he
facilitates in a manner that does not allow listeners or speakers to interpret the other’s stories in
an unfavorable way. Fourth, he/she is mindful that all in the gathering do not ascribe to the other,
opinions that they do not profess. Fifth, holding the context for dialogue, would also require the
facilitator to avoid presentations or stories that serve the interest of one party or person at the
expense of others. Sixth, circumstances that do not concern the subjects in the conversation,
ought to be kept neutral. The success of this facilitator-guided-community gatherings would
fundamentally depend on the gatherers’ willingness and openness to be attuned not only with
each other’s stories, but also with the larger purpose: reconciliation.
In this gathering we will intentionally expand Heidegger’s understanding of ‘dwelling.’
As dwellers, he noted, we dwell as mortals on the earth. For him,
... ‘on the earth’ already means ‘under the sky.’ Both of these also mean ‘remaining
before the divinities’ and include a ‘belonging to men’s being with one another.’ By a
primal oneness, the four - earth and sky, divinities and mortals – belong together in one.
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 327)
Heidegger calls this “simple oneness of the four... the fourfold´ (1977, p. 328), and that as
mortals, human beings are in the fourfold by dwelling in ways that experience being brought to
peace. And, as we noted in our first aritcle, for him, to be brought to peace is to act in ways that
spare and preserves each other from harm and danger. This understanding of dwelling includes
and extends beyond relationships between and among Indigenous and Non-Indigenous
populations. It extends and equally applies to our relationship with our land, earth, water, and
climate change. What then would being in the fourfold mean for gatherers who come into our
proposed process? To what would they need to pay attention? We would propose that gatherers
be brought to peace and remain in peace by paying attention to the fourfold connection among
and between the head, the heart, the hands, and the holy.
The Head
If the purpose of dwelling is to preserve each other from harm, then the conversation in this
gathering is guided by exploring complex and difficult issues in ways that safeguards the other.
Part of this process would involve giving the “heads” (minds) in the gathering an opportunity to
surface their own prejudices and stereotypes of the other. What if the “head” chooses to hide its
thoughts? What might the consequences look like in this state of hiding?
First, in hiding, the head cannot become aware that its active participation in stereotyping
will in effect shape not only how that head interacts with other heads, but it will also shape the
stereotyped head’s response. In surfacing those prejudices in a way that all can see, and in
risking this vulnerability by exposing oneself to the actions of others, a person can become aware
that their thoughts can present themselves in ways that pretends that they are not representations.
From the perspective of ecosystemic thinking, ‘representations’ are the acts of the observer. The
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pretense is that the observer makes an observation and then pretends that their presentations are
in fact an objective truth (representation).
Second, ecosystems-thinking raises our consciousness in ways that are consistent with
second-order cybernetics (Bateson, 1979; Mead, 1968), namely, in enabling an awareness that
observers are and cannot not be a part of a totally interconnected universe. In showing what is
hidden, in observing one’s own participation in the making of their observations, the head frees
itself from being trapped in the theatre of its thoughts. In the process of showing what is hidden,
the heads offers themselves the possibility of becoming observers of their own thinking. There is
an opportunity for a higher-order awareness that there cannot be a separation between the
observer and the observed. Whereas our predominant scientific mode of thinking would ask
observers to remove themselves from their observations for the sake of objectivity, ecosystemic
thinking would say that we cannot observe without being actively involved in our observing.
Ecosystemic thinking would call on the “head” to observe, observe its observations, and observe
its observing its observations.
The Heart
In beginning with the imagination that “we are all in this together” the gathering hearts gather
because they feel the need, as we noted earlier, for ‘higher order transformative change.’ The
gathering accepts, as a starting point, that people feel the need for change because “where
nothing is felt, nothing matters” (Langer, as cited in Burns, 1978, p. 44). A similar sentiment was
fervidly expressed by Marx (1978) when he reflected on the glory and pain of industrialization:
“But although the atmosphere in which we live weighs upon everyone like a 20,000 lb. force, do
you feel it?” (p. 577). How then can they go about the process of creating conditions for feeling
the need for transformative change?
Sharing of Stories
Feelings for change cannot come through formal processes like power point presentations or
statistical charts. They do not, for example, touch hearts in the same way that stories do. Stories,
according to McKee (2203) “involve people at the deepest level,” in that it “fulfills a profound
human need to grasp the patterns of living – not merely as an intellectual exercise, but with a
very personal, emotional experience” (p. 52). In relation to social change, we hear a critical
theorist, Habermas (1988), revealing one aspect of storytelling:
When we tell stories, we cannot avoid also saying indirectly how the subjects involved in
them are faring and what fate the collectivity they belong is experiencing. Nevertheless,
we can make harm to personal or threats to social integration visibly only indirectly in
narratives. (p. 137)
According to a psychologist, Mair, stories are all we have in that we “do not know the world
other than as a story world... We live through stories. We are lived by the stories of our race and
place” (1988, p. 127). And from an acclaimed native American poet and novelist, Silko, we
hear: ““I will tell you something about stories...They aren’t just entertainment. Don’t be fooled.
They are all we have, you see, to fight off illness and death. You don’t have anything if you
don’t have stories” (1977, n.p.). While stories are all we have, Mair (1988) also cautions us in
that that stories can hold us together and they can keep us apart. While some, over the period of
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human history, have used stories to incite violence and to divide, Galtung also reminds us that
“people cannot live apart and in agony forever” (1998, p. 14).
In community gatherings, like the one we propose, we would invite all in the gathering to
share their stories of what they as a collective are experiencing while they are in the middle of
this bigger Canadian story. So, it is not only a sharing of one’s experience (Person A) of being in
a residential school system – as valid and important as they are – but also one that includes a
sharing that includes an experiencing (Person B’s story) of what it means to be in the middle of
that historical experience. Through this process, it offers all in the gathering to make visible
through their stories “the harm to personal or threats to social integration.”
At the same time, we wonder if stories of harm to the person, or threats to social
integration are all that we have? Are there stories that warrant celebration? Are there stories of
‘small wins’ that are waiting to be told? Are there stories of the courage of reconciliation, of
being true to a deeply held the value of being in this together, that are waiting to be shared? The
sharing of celebratory stories is that they give us the positive energy we need (as a possibility) to
attend to that which has contributed to insult and injury.
The Hands
While grapes are considered as a fruit of the earth, the transformation of grapes to wine is the
work of human hands (and feet). What this refers to us is that in these community gatherings all
participants be offered an opportunity to share home-cooked meals together. It is one way of
transforming our messy reality into another kind of a “mess,” namely a meal. There is a common
human adage that says: ‘a family that eats together, stays together.’ Whereas eating is necessary
for the preservation our own lives (eat to live), the sharing of a meal goes beyond the mere
preservation of life (live to eat) and this distinguishes this action as human action. The sharing of
a meal involves a consciously intended higher purpose, namely being brought to peace. It
transcends mere utility and usefulness. It is choice worthy because it is deeply connected to its
purposiveness.
In coming together over a meal cooked by human hands, those who partake in an
ordinary event like sharing a meal or meals give themselves permission to converse with each
other in ways that are free of internal and external coercions, repressions, social deformations,
and free from feeling helpless. In so doing, it can become an opportunity to consider an
embellished version of Chomsky’s (1965) use of linguistic competence. More that increasing
grammatical sentences among a homogenous population, I would suggest that it can also be
favorable, in heterogenous populations for no other purpose than to attain understanding by
listening for the sake of understanding and not judging. Partakers offer themselves the possibility
to share a meal in a way that sets their hands to the task at hand, namely, of communicating
competently with a higher purpose in mind: healing and reconciliation.
The Holy
One critical non-negotiable in our proposed gatherings is that all gatherers are called to
intentionally preserve each other from harm and danger. Preserving each other from harm and
danger, is held by all to be holy and sacred.. In his Call to Holiness in Today’s World, Pope
Francis shared that “we are all called to be holy by living our lives with love and by bearing
witness in everything we do, wherever we find ourselves” (2015). This call to holiness is not the
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work of persons who seclude themselves in prayerful solitude but rather the work of all to bear
witness in everything they do. Within the context of reconciliation, we are all called to bear
witness to our shared purpose, reconciliation, by lovingly embracing the work of sparing and
preserving each other from harm and danger.
Perhaps it is precisely the presence of the holy/divine in our mortal world that inspired
Jung, the psychologist, to have a Latin quote carved in stone above his front door: Vocatus Atque
Non Vocatus Deus Aderit. Translated, it means: “Summoned or not, the god will be there.” In his
interview with Henderson (2010), Thomas Moore suggested that this is an act of Jung the magus
rather than Jung the psychologist. “The magus” Moore shared, “understands that everything in
the world has its own spirit or spirituality” (as cited in Henderson, 2010, p. 137). For example,
we may enter an open air-aired market-place and feel its spirit. We may take a hike in the woods
and feel a special spirit. We may enter a shopping mall and feel the absence of spirit, or a place
without soul. In this case, we leave the mall feeling empty.
For Moore, rituals and narratives keep the magic (magus) and spirit alive. He further
articulated that we “need family, home, friends, works, sex, and the vagaries of everyday life to
keep the deep soul engaged” (as cited in Henderson, 2010, p. 143). In our proposed facilitatorguided gatherings, all in the gathering can celebrate their connectedness through their rituals and
story-telling. Rituals and story-telling offers the imagination to connect with the soul of any
community and to keep the soul engaged. As noted earlier, Kornfield (1993), this is what it
means to create community. It is constructed when people gather by “bringing honesty, respect,
and kindness to support an awakening of the sacred” (p. 24). Exclude this and we risk the loss of
soul. Ecosystems thinking could be heard as saying that the ‘loss of soul’ is the loss of a soulful
relationship and interest in the wisdom of the soul (Moore, 1992). In feeling the need for
reconciliation (heart) we connect to the wisdom of the soul (the holy) in the sharing of good food
(the work of human hands), and in satisfying conversations (head) and we act as if we are in the
company of genuine friends. The ‘holy’ of deutero-learning places us in the company of other
storytellers and in a shared companionship. The promise of these experiences is that they can
stay in memory and touch the hearts in way that are themselves unpredictable . It is in this way
that we can stay connected to the human actions of building trust, being brought to peace, and
remaining in peace.
Conclusion
In this paper, we raised a question: What conditions must be present and what learning process
can we construct to make it possible for self and others to act from the perspective of ‘we are all
in this together?’ From the perspective of conditions, I offered three. First, soulful engagement. I
argued that the quest for reconciliation, must occur at three interrelated levels of soulful
engagement: intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural. Second, I reasoned that the affair of peace
leadership is an interconnected affair of the head, heart, hand and holy. Third, purposeful
dwelling. I talked about a critical non-negotiable condition (holy) in cultivating peace, namely
that gatherers gather with a purposeful intent- to preserve and spare each other from harm and
danger. From the perspective of process, I offered a deutero-learning framework. In a proposed
facilitator-guided community gatherings, the deutero-learning process would require all who
gather to coordinate their efforts in ways that connect the fourfold: head, heart, hands, and holy.
Deutero-learning promises the possibility for radical transformative change- of outer form and
inner character. I end by extending an invitation to all Canadians to engage in the process of
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reconciliation not only because it is a Canadian problem, but also because this is what it would
mean to treat all Canadian persons like persons. And like all invitations, I understand that all
invited are free to accept or reject. That choice belongs to one and all. So, what will your choice
be?
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